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INTRODUCTION

Sandor Demkovich was a beloved music director, choir director, and
organist employed by St. Andrew the Apostle Parish, a Roman Catholic
church in Illinois.1 Demkovich describes himself as a devout Catholic who
loves the church, music, and spirituality.2 Demkovich is also gay and
diabetic.3 At work, Demkovich’s direct supervisor continuously made
derogatory comments and demeaning epithets relating to Demkovich’s
sexual orientation and physical condition.4 After two years at St.
Andrew’s, Demkovich married his long-term partner of fifteen years.5
Almost immediately, Demkovich was asked to resign because his
marriage was “against the Catholic Church.”6 When he refused to resign,
St. Andrew’s fired him.7
This religious organization’s decision to fire a well-qualified8 and
experienced employee based solely on sexual orientation is not an
isolated incident.9 In fact, it is a frequent occurrence.10 Roncalli High
School, a private Catholic school in Indianapolis, fired Lynn Starkey after
she had worked there for almost forty years.11 She held several positions,

1. Demkovich v. St. Andrew the Apostle Par. (Demkovich II), 3 F.4th 968, 973 (7th
Cir. 2021) (en banc). Demkovich began working at St. Andrews in 2012. Id.
2. Tina Sfondeles, Catholic Music Director Fired After Same-sex Wedding Files
Complaint, CHI. SUN TIMES (Jun. 24, 2016), www.chicago.suntimes.com/
2016/6/24/18405397/catholic-music-director-fired-after-same-sex-wedding-filescomplaint [perma.cc/8VW9-DRPV].
3. Demkovich II, 3 F.4th at 973.
4. Id.
5. Sfondeles, supra note 2.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Throughout the course of litigation, St. Andrews never took issue with
Demkovich’s ability to perform his job duties.
9. Patrick Hornbeck, Chicago Archdiocese takes ‘religious liberty’ too far in
Demkovich case, NAT’L CATHOLIC REP. (Feb. 17, 2021), www.ncronline.org/news/
opinion/chicago-archdiocese-takes-religious-liberty-too-far-demkovich-case
[perma.cc/7SD7-5ZL2].
10. See Francis DeBernardo & Robert Shine, Employees of Catholic Institutions Who
Have Been Fired, Forced to Resign, Had Offers Rescinded, or Had Their Jobs Threatened
Because of LGBT Issues, NEW WAYS MINISTRY (last updated Sept. 21, 2021),
www.newwaysministry.org/issues/employment/employment-disputes/
[perma.cc/592C-DULT] (providing a list from 2007 to date of “workers in Catholic
institutions who have been fired, forced to resign, had offers rescinded, or had their
jobs threatened because of LGBT issues.”). As of September 21, 2021, over 80
employees lost their jobs due to LGBT issues. Id.
11. Starkey v. Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Indianapolis, Inc., 2021 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 158254, at *3 (S.D. Ind. Aug. 11, 2021). Starkey worked at Roncalli from 1978 to
2019. Id. Starkey was hired as a New Testament Teacher, which required her to obtain
a certification to teach religion classes. Id. In 1997, Starkey became a Guidance
Counselor, a role in which she served for 10 years. Id. While in this position, she did
not teach religion or maintain her certification to do so. Id. Finally, in 2007, Starkey
became Co-Director of Guidance. Id. Starkey held this position until her termination in
2019. Id. at *4. Accordingly, the final 21 years of her tenure at Roncalli were spent in
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including New Testament teacher, Choral Director, Fine Arts Chair,
Guidance Counselor, and Co-Director of Guidance.12 In 2015, Starkey
entered a same-sex marriage.13 Despite being aware of Starkey’s sexual
orientation long before her decision to marry her partner and despite
continuing to employ her for several years after the marriage, Roncalli
terminated Starkey because her marriage violated Catholic teachings. 14
In addition to being terminated for their sexual orientations, both
Starkey15 and Demkovich16 were harassed in the workplace because of
their marginalized identities. They each sued the religious entities that
employed them under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.17 Among other
things, Title VII prohibits employers from creating hostile work
environments through “discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and
insult.”18 Unfortunately, although both Demkovich and Starkey are clear
victims of discrimination under Title VII, their claims against the religious
organizations that employed them were barred by a legal doctrine known
as the ministerial exception.19
The ministerial exception is a judicially created doctrine that
protects religious organizations from discrimination suits brought by

the role of Guidance Counselor and Co-Director of Guidance. Id.
12. Id.
13. Starkey v. Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Indianapolis, 496 F. Supp. 3d 1195,
1199 (S.D. Ind. 2020).
14. Id. at 1205 (examining the Church’s argument that the offered religious
justification for not rehiring Starkey is a neutral, nondiscriminatory reason for her
termination).
15. In 2018, Shelly Fitzgerald served as Starkey’s co-Director of guidance. Starkey,
496 F. Supp. 3d at 1199. Fitzgerald is also lesbian and married to a woman. Id. Roncalli
officials confronted Fitzgerald about her marital status and put her on paid
administrative leave. Id. This treatment of Fitzgerald left Starkey with the
understanding that gay employees were not welcome at Roncalli. Id. at 2000. Starkey
lived in constant fear that she would be terminated next. Id. After the Roncalli principal
confronted Starkey about being in a civil union, Starkey learned that her contract
would not be renewed. Id.
16. Demkovich alleged that Reverend Dada, his direct supervisor, “humiliated and
belittled” him on a repeated basis. Demkovich v. St. Andrew the Apostle Par., 973 F.3d
718, 721(7th Cir. 2020) (rev’d en banc). Reverend Dada frequently used epithets that
showed hostility towards Demkovich’s sexual orientation. Id. When Demkovich
married, these epithets worsened. Id. Dada also repeatedly ridiculed Demkovich for
his weight and medical issues. Id. These comments had no connection to Demkovich’s
job performance. Id.
17. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.S. §2000e-2(a) (1964) (“It shall
be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to fail or refuse to hire or to
discharge any individual, or otherwise discriminate against any individual…because of
such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”). See Bostock v. Clayton
Cty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1737 (2020) (finding Title VII prohibits discrimination based on
sexual orientation).
18. Harris v. Forklift Sys., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1986) (quoting Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v.
Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986)).
19. Demkovich II, 3 F.4th at 985 (holding “the ministerial exception precludes
Demkovich’s hostile work environment claims against the church.”); Starkey, 2021 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 158254 at *2 (holding “the ministerial exception bars all of Starkey’s
claims. . .”), aff’d, 41 F. 45h 931, 935 (7th Cir. 2022).
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“ministerial employees.”20 It is an affirmative defense that religious
employers can raise when they are sued under various antidiscrimination statutes like Title VII.21 Generally, if an employer is
religiously affiliated and an employee is deemed a minister for the
purpose of the exception, the ministerial exception may bar a plaintiff’s
claim.22 Though often applied in lower courts, the Supreme Court
deferred ruling on the extent of the ministerial exception until 2012. 23
Today, there are several questions left unanswered by the Supreme
Court regarding the application of the ministerial exception: To whom
should such an exception apply? Should the exception categorically bar
certain kinds of claims against religious organizations? What standard of
review should apply when determining whether the ministerial exception
applies? For individuals like Demkovich and Starkey, the answers to these
questions are critical. The uncertainty surrounding the application of the
ministerial exception at the lower court level led to all claims brought
being absolutely barred, despite Starkey24 and Demkovich25 having a
20. See generally Caroline Mala Corbin, Above the Law? The Constitutionality of the
Ministerial Exemption from Antidiscrimination Law, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1965, 19731976 (2007) (discussing the ramifications of the ministerial exception through a
constitutional lens).
21. See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171,
n.4 (2012) (clarifying that the ministerial exception operates as an affirmative
defense).
22. Blair A. Crunk, New Wine in an Old Chalice: The Ministerial Exception's Humble
Roots, 73 LA. L. REV. 1081, 1087 (2013) (breaking down the application of the
ministerial exception into two steps).
23. Corbin, supra note 20, at 1968; Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 190 (concluding that
“there is a ministerial exception grounded in the Religion Clauses of the First
Amendment.”); see also Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch. v. Morrissey-Berru, 140 S. Ct. 2049,
2055 (2020).
24. Starkey, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 158254, at *1. Starkey provided evidence that her
day-to-day responsibilities were actually secular in nature. Id. at 20. She explained that
her regular duties include “scheduling students for classes, helping students with
college applications, providing SAT and ACT test prep tools, administering AP exams,
and offering career guidance.” Id. Citing concerns of excessive entanglement, the
district court ignored Starkey’s characterization of her actual job duties and instead
found that because her employer “clearly intended for [her] role to be connected to the
school’s [Catholic] mission,” Starkey was a minister for the purposes of the exception.
Id. at *21 (citing Grussgott v. Milwaukee Jewish Day Sch., Inc., 882 F.3d, 655, 660 (7th
Cir. 2018)).
25. Demkovich v. St. Andrew the Apostle Par., 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 161658 at *7
(N.D. Ill. 2017). At this point in the litigation, the district court was tasked with
determining the threshold question of whether Demkovich was a minister for the
purposes of the exception. Id. at *5. The Archdiocese argued that Demkovich was a
minister because he “performed the ministerial function of selecting, directing, and
playing the music at Catholic masses.” Id. at *6. Demkovich asserted that the
Archdiocese was placing too much value on his job title and ignoring the actual
substance of the work he engaged in. Id. at *7. He explained that he was only a parttime employee, that Reverend Dada made the final decisions on music selection, and
that Demkovich never actually planned the liturgy himself. Id. The district court
ultimately found that because Demkovich’s Complaint stated that he “select[ed] music
played during masses,” the applicability of the ministerial exception was “inescapable.”
Id. at *8.
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tenuous connection to their organizations’ religious duties.26
This Comment challenges the conclusion that the ministerial
exception bars all claims of hostile work environments brought against
religious organizations. After exploring the roots of the ministerial
exception, this Comment asserts that the ministerial exception must be
treated as a rebuttable presumption when hostile work environment
claims are being adjudicated. Part II discusses the history of the
ministerial exception, its significance, and how it has evolved over time.
Part III examines how the ministerial exception has been used in the
adjudication of hostile work environment claims, noting the benefits it
brings to society while also recognizing what has been sacrificed in its
application. Part IV asserts that the ministerial exception should not
categorically bar all claims of hostile work environment. Instead, the
court should treat the application of the ministerial exception as a
rebuttable presumption and allow an employee to show that their claim
involves entirely secular issues. This approach will simultaneously
support religious freedom while respecting the rights and dignity of
disenfranchised individuals who may otherwise have no form of recourse
for discriminatory action.

II.

BACKGROUND

There have been conflicting viewpoints surrounding the breadth of
religious liberty in this country.27 The First Amendment states that
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .” 28 Broadly, the Court has
interpreted the First Amendment as protecting individuals against state
intrusion on religious liberty, commonly referred to as the separation of

26. Rachel Barrick, The Ministerial Exception: Seeking Clarity and Precision Amid
Inconsistent Application of the Hosanna-Tabor Framework, 70 EMORY L.J. 465, 470
(2020) (recognizing that although “a teacher with negligible religious duties should be
differentiated from a teacher with significant and constant religious duties, many
courts have not taken this approach, in part due to the subjectivity of what the religious
employer itself would consider to be negligible versus significant and courts' fear of
intruding on church autonomy in that expectation.”). See generally Katherine Hinkle,
What's in a Name? The Definition of "Minister" in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran
Church and School v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 34 BERKELEY J. EMP. &
LAB. L. 283, 343 (2013) (advancing a theory that the Court’s decision to give deference
to religious employers regarding the application of the ministerial exception may lead
to increased discrimination against their employees).
27. See John D. Inazu, The Four Freedoms and the Future of Religious Liberty, 92
N.C.L. REV. 787, 791 (2014) (reviewing how “[t]he history of religious liberty emerges
through a complicated and fractured narrative that includes periods of heightened
commitment to pluralism and periods of intense neglect.”); see also S.I. Strong,
Religious Rights in Historical, Theoretical, and International Context: Hobby Lobby as a
Jurisprudential Anomaly?, 48 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 813, 818 (2015) (placing religious
rights into “historical, international, and comparative context” so that modern-day
Supreme Court decisions can be best understood).
28. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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“church and state.”29 To preserve this separation, the government cannot
impermissibly interfere with the exercise of religion, nor can it establish
a State religion.30 In this spirit, courts have held that religious
organizations should be free from state interference when handling
matters “of faith and doctrine.”31 The separation of church and state,
however, is not absolute.32
This section begins by exploring the history of religious liberty in
our nation. It highlights the seemingly inevitable tension between
religious liberty principles and anti-discrimination safeguards in the
employment context.33 Under this framework, this section introduces the
concept of the ministerial exception and its judicial creation. This section
proceeds to introduce hostile work environment claims, which are
distinct employment disputes that address concerns of unlawful
harassment in the workplace.34 Finally, this section returns to the story of
Demkovich, the beloved choir director at St. Andrew the Apostle Parish
who brought two hostile work environment claims against his religious
employer.35

A. Religious Liberty at the Federal Level
In the past, the Supreme Court treated the free exercise of religion
as an especially protected interest.36 Restrictions on the free exercise of
29. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947) (maintaining that “[t]he First
Amendment has erected a wall between church and state.”); Reynolds v. United States,
98 U.S. 145, 162 (1878) (enunciating that “[r]eligous freedom is guaranteed
everywhere throughout the United States, so far as congressional interference is
concerned.”).
30. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 719 (2005) (detecting that the Establishment
Clause “commands a separation of church and state” and the Free Exercise Clause
“requires government respect for, and noninterference with, the religious beliefs and
practices of our Nation’s people.”).
31. Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox Church, 344 U.S. 94,
116 (1952).
32. See Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 312 (1952) (pointing out that “[t]he First
Amendment, however, does not say that in every and all respect there shall be a
separation of Church and State.”); Our Lady of Guadalupe, 140 S. Ct. at 2060 (declaring
that religious institutions do not enjoy a general immunity from secular law).
33. See generally Marilyn Gabriela Robb, Pluralism at Work: Rethinking the
Relationship Between Religious Liberty and LGBTQ Rights in the Workplace, 54 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 917, 919 (presenting several cases that “pit[ted] religious liberty
interests against antidiscrimination rights.”).
34. See Hostile Work Environment (Abusive Work Environment), THE WOLTERS
KLUWER BOUVIER LAW DICTIONARY (Desk Ed. 2012). A hostile work environment is “a
workplace in which harassment, whether by intentional discrimination or by ridicule,
is caused or allowed by the employer, which either interferes with the employee's
performance of the job or is sufficiently severe or sufficiently pervasive as to amount
to abuse.” Id.
35. See Demkovich II, 3 F.4th at 973; see also discussion supra Part I.
36. John W. Whitehead, The Conservative Supreme Court and the Demise of the Free
Exercise of Religion, 7 TEMP. POL. & C.R. L. REV. 1, 5 (1997) (summarizing that “for
approximately the past fifty years, the Supreme Court has on occasion stated that the
free exercise of religion under the First Amendment is an especially protected
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religion were allowed only when there were “the gravest abuses,
endangering paramount interest[s] . . .”37 Early on, the Supreme Court
applied a balancing test that looked at whether the challenged action
imposed a substantial burden on religion and whether the state action
served a compelling interest.38 This test, known as the Sherbert balancing
test, was designed to protect religious practice from any form of
government intrusion.39 Under the Sherbert balancing test, the
government must have a compelling interest to justify the substantial
infringement of an individual’s First Amendment right to religious
liberty.40 Following Sherbert v. Verner in 1963, a challenged government
regulation was almost always struck down for burdening an individual’s
religious liberties.41
Later on, the Court strayed from this approach of treating the free
exercise of religion as a supreme right.42 Instead, the Court began to
uphold neutral, generally applicable laws that implicated religious
concerns.43 In Employment Division v. Smith, the Court was asked to
determine whether an Oregon law that prohibited the possession of all
non-prescribed controlled substances, including peyote—used for
sacramental and religious purposes in the Native American community—
violated an individual’s free exercise rights.44 Ultimately, the Court found
no constitutional issue with the law.45 The Court’s decision was rooted in
the belief that the right to free exercise does not make religious entities
immune from other laws.46 Thus, the criminal statute was upheld despite
the religious implications.47

interest.”).
37. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963) (quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323
U.S. 516, 530 (1940)).
38. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403 (creating the Sherbert balancing test); see also
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214–15 (1972) (applying the Sherbert balancing
test).
39. See generally Allison J. Cornwell, Free Exercise Clause-Sacrificial Rites Become
Constitutional Rights on the Altar of Babalu Aye, 16 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 623, 623–25
(1994) (distinguishing Sherbert as the first Supreme Court decision to set forth the
“compelling interest” test that “provide[s] substantive protection from governmental
interference with religious exercise.”).
40. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403–07.
41. See id.at 410 (finding that an employee who was fired for not working on the
Sabbath could not be denied unemployment benefits); see also Yoder, 406 U.S. at 207
(finding that Wisconsin’s state laws mandated school attendance until age 16 were
unconstitutional because they interfered with Amish values). But see Braunfeld v.
Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961) (upholding a criminal statute that required merchants to
close on Sunday).
42. Whitehead, supra note 36, at 6 (illustrating how the Court began to treat the
supremacy of the free exercise clause as a “constitutional anomaly.”).
43. Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 876 (1990) (declining to apply the
Sherbert balancing test).
44. Id.
45. Id. at 890 (holding that Oregon’s prohibition on the possession of peyote was
constitutional).
46. Id. at 878–97.
47. Id.
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By holding that the Free Exercise Clause was only triggered when
religion was targeted for unique “burdens,” the Court rejected prior
contentions that religious organizations should be free from state
involvement entirely.48 Immediately following the Employment Division
decision, states were free to legislate in ways that impacted religious
beliefs, so long as the government regulation did not specifically target
religion.49 Thus, this decision is often viewed by legal scholars as
overruling several years of Free Exercise precedent, as it strayed from the
traditional approach of treating religious liberty as a supreme right.50
Three years after the Court’s decision in Employment Division,
Congress enacted the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993
(hereinafter “RFRA”) to preserve religious liberty.51 The RFRA restored
and codified the compelling interest test set forth in Sherbert and
“provide[d] a claim or defense to persons whose religious exercise is
substantially burdened by government.”52 Since its enactment, there has
been a divide in the federal circuit courts regarding its application. 53
Originally, the RFRA applied to both state and federal governments. 54
However, in City of Boerne v. Flores, the Supreme Court held that Congress
lacked power under the Fourteenth Amendment to enforce the RFRA
against state and local governments.55 Nevertheless, the RFRA continues

48. Mark W. Cordes, The First Amendment and Religion After Hosanna-Tabor, 41
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 299, 301 (2014); see also Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. at 879
(reasoning that “[w]e have never held that an individual’s religious beliefs excuse him
from compliance with an otherwise valid law . . .”).
49. Compare Rector, Wardens, & Members of Vestry of St. Bartholomew's Church
v. New York, 914 F.2d 348, 355 (2d Cir. 1990) (upholding a zoning law as a valid,
neutral regulation despite having an incidental effect on religious organizations), with
Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 524 (1993) (striking
down a city ordinance that banned animal sacrifice because there was clear legislative
intent to target the Santiera religion).
50. Kenneth Kirk, Parsing the First Amendment for the Faithful, 28 ALASKA BAR RAG
6, 6 (2004); see also Whitehead, supra note 36, at 5 (describing Employment Division as
the “apparent burial” of free exercise).
51. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 107 Stat. 1488, 42 U.S.C.S. § 2000bb
(1993).
52. 42 U.S.C.S. § 2000bb(b)(2) (1993) (setting forth the purpose of the RFRA); see
also Sherbert, 347 U.S. at 406 (requiring South Carolina to show a “compelling state
interest” that “justifies the substantial infringement of appellant’s First Amendment
right.”).
53. Shruti Chaganti, Why the Religious Freedom Restoration Act Provides a Defense
in Suits by Private Plaintiffs, 99 VA. L. REV. 343, 343–44 (2013) (“The circuits are split
as to whether RFRA can be claimed as a defense in citizen suits . . .”).
54. See generally David B. Rosengard, “Three Hots and a Cot and a Lot of Talk”:
Discussing Federal Rights-Based Avenues for Prisoner Access to Vegan Meals, 23 ANIMAL
L. 355, 380 (2017) (laying out the history of the RFRA); James M. Oleske, Jr., Lukumi at
Twenty: A Legacy of Uncertainty for Religious Liberty and Animal Welfare, 19 ANIMAL L.
295, 313 n.107 (2013) (addressing the nuances of an RFRA claim).
55. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997); see also Mary L. Topliff,
Validity, Construction, and Application of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (42
U.S.C.A. 2000bb et seq.), 135 A.L.R. Fed. 121, *3 (2021) (clearing up that the City of
Boerne invalidated the RFRA only as applied to state and local governments and that
the unconstitutional parts of the RFRA were severable).
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to apply to the federal government.56
Today, the compelling interest test57 is used when determining
whether a federal government action that interferes with religious liberty
is permissible.58 This test gives a large amount of deference to religious
organizations, which often permits them to operate free from
government interference.59 Still, there exists a large amount of
uncertainty regarding how much religious liberty citizens must be
afforded in certain contexts, including the employment context.

B. Religious Liberty in the Employment Context
The Court’s obligation to protect religious liberty exists in tension
with federal and state anti-discrimination laws.60 Under Title VII, it is
unlawful for employers to discriminate against individuals because of
their race, color, religion, sex or national origin.61 Congress enacted Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act with the intent “to strike at the entire spectrum
of disparate treatment of men and women” in employment. 62
Acknowledging the tension between Title VII and religious liberty,
Congress permitted religious employers to discriminate based on
religion.63 Title VII explicitly states that it does not apply to “a religious
corporation, association, educational institution, or society with respect
to the employment of individuals of a particular religion.” 64 As such,
religious associations are permitted to hire based on an applicant’s
religion, so long as it is a “bona fide occupational qualification.” 65

56. See Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418,
423 (2006) (adjudicating a Free Exercise claim through the application of the RFRA).
57. 42 U.S.C.S. § 2000bb-1 (1993). The compelling interest test is explicitly
included in the RFRA. Id. The test comes from a series of Supreme Court decisions, all
going back to the free exercise principles laid out in Sherbert.
58. Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 439 (holding that the RFRA protected members of
religious society from having sacramental tea banned by the Controlled Substances Act
seized); see also Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 688 (2014) (utilizing
the RFRA to determine whether government regulations that mandated corporations
to provide health insurance coverage for contraception significantly burdened the
corporation’s religious freedom).
59. See, e.g., Burwell, 573 U.S. at 682 (exempting for-profit corporations from the
Affordable Care Act’s contraception requirement due to their corporate owner’s
religious objections). See generally Sara K. Finnigan, The Conflict Between the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 48 FLA. ST. U.L. REV.
257, 273–79 (2020) (outlining how courts have interpreted the RFRA thus far).
60. See, e.g., Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct.
1719, 1731 (2018) (analyzing whether a baker’s refusal to make a cake for a same-sex
wedding violates the Constitution where the baker cited religious reasons for the
refusal).
61. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.S. §2000e-2(a).
62. Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986) (quoting Los Angeles
Dept. of Water and Power v. Manhart, 43 U.S. 702, 707 n.13 (1978)).
63. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(a) (1964).
64. Id.
65. Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of the Univ. of Cal. v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 744
n.8 (2010).
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This statutory exemption does not, however, permit religious
employers to discriminate against other enumerated, protected classes
such as race or sex.66 Thus, it was left open to the judiciary to determine
how Title VII applies to religious organizations.67 A study of court cases
involving religious liberty and discrimination claims reveals that an
employee’s interest in gaining employment free from discrimination, an
employer’s interest in their own free exercise of religion, and the state’s
interest in eliminating discrimination often conflict with one another.68
Two recent rulings on the Supreme Court’s 2020 docket best
illustrates these competing interests.69 First, in Bostock v. Clayton County,
the Court held that an employer who fired an individual for being
homosexual or transgender was discriminating in violation of Title VII. 70
Additionally, the Bostock Court acknowledged a general concern that
compliance with Title VII in this manner may require some employers to
violate their religious convictions. 71 The Court ultimately concluded,
however, that religious liberty was not at issue in Bostock.72 Still, by
expanding Title VII anti-discrimination safeguards through a
66. See Patsakis v. Greek Orthodox Archdiocese of Am., 339 F. Supp. 2d 689, 693
(W.D. Pa. 2004); Rayburn v. Gen. Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d
1164, 1166 (4th Cir. 1985) (propounding that “[t]he language and the legislative
history of Title VII both indicate that the statute exempts religious institutions only to
a narrow extent.”).
67. See George L. Blum, Application of First Amendment's "Ministerial Exception" or
"Ecclesiastical Exception" to Federal Civil Rights Claims, 41 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 445, *2 (2021)
(scrutinizing how the ministerial exception has been applied in court).
68. See Steven D. Jamar, Accommodating Religion at Work: A Principled Approach
to Title VII and Religious Freedom, 40 N.Y.L SCH. L. REV 719, 724–26 (1996) (exploring
the philosophical underpinnings of employee and employer’s religious interests).
69. Timothy J. Tracey, Deal, No Deal: Bostock, Our Lady of Guadalupe, and the Fate
of Religious Hiring Rights at the U.S. Supreme Court, 19 AVE MARIA L. REV. 105, 106
(2021) (noticing the court’s conflicting decisions on religious freedom and LGBTQ
rights).
70. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1754. The Bostock Court used a plain textualist approach
in reaching this conclusion. See Marc Spindelman, Justice Gorsuch's Choice: From
Bostock v. Clayton County to Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization, 13
CONLAWNOW 11, 13 (2021), Ohio State Legal Studies Research Paper No. 647, available
at www.ssrn.com/abstract=3912127 [perma.cc/4FJP-7XXB] (analyzing the impact of
the Bostock decision). Even though Title VII does not explicitly include sexual
orientation or transgender status as a protected class, the court found that the “plain
terms” of Title VII’s prohibition on “sex”-based discrimination included a ban on sexual
orientation or transgender-status discrimination. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1743.
71. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1754. It was undisputed that the employees in Bostock
were fired for being homosexual or transgender. Id. at 1744. A legitimate religious
objection to homosexuality or being transgender is often assumed by courts. See Jack
M. Battaglia, Religion, Sexual Orientation, and Self-Realization: First Amendment
Principles and Anti-Discrimination Laws, 76 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 189, 196 (1999)
(outlining the historical relationship between religious organizations and homosexual
individuals).
72. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1754 (advising that “[h]ow these doctrines protecting
religious liberty interact with Title VII are questions for future cases.”). Because none
of the employers in Bostock argued that compliance with Title VII would interfere with
their right to religious liberty, the Court declined to provide guidance on how to
address the existing tension between Title VII (1964) and religious liberty. Id.
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“straightforward application of legal terms with plain and settled
meaning,” the Court’s ruling highlights the importance of having antidiscrimination safeguards in place, even when religious concerns may be
implicated.73 Thus, the Bostock ruling seemingly left open the question of
whether anti-discrimination laws under Title VII, which now protect the
rights of homosexual and transgender individuals, categorically infringe
on an employer’s right to religious liberty.
Just one month later, the Court decided Little Sisters of the Poor
Saints Peter & Paul Home v. Pennsylvania, which bolstered a religious
employer’s right to follow their religious convictions.74 In Little Sisters of
the Poor, the Court upheld the constitutionality of a religious and moral
exemption from the contraceptive mandate included in the Affordable
Care Act.75 After discussing the extensive history behind the religious
exemption and previous challenges made to it, the Court found that the
administrators of the Affordable Care Act had adequate statutory
authority to exempt or otherwise accommodate religious employers. 76
Though Little Sisters of the Poor did not involve a Title VII claim, it still
reinforced a religious employer’s right to operate in accordance with
their “sincerely held religious beliefs.”77 This decision has also been

73. Spindelman, supra note 70, at 13 (citing Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1743).
74. Little Sisters of the Poor Saints Peter & Paul Home v. Pennsylvania, 140 S. Ct.
2367, 2373 (2020) (upholding a religious exemption to the Affordable Care Act’s
contraceptive mandate); see Tracey, supra note 69, at 107 (describing this decision,
along with Our Lady of Guadalupe, as showing a “continued concern for
accommodating religious exercise.”).
75. Little Sisters of the Poor, 140 S. Ct. 2367, 2373 (holding that the Departments
who administer the relevant ACA provision “had the authority to provide exemptions
for the regulatory contraceptive requirements for employers with religious and
conscientious objections.”) (emphasis added).
76. Id. at 2380. Statutory authority was found in a portion of the Affordable Care
Act which reads:
a group health plan and a health insurance issuer offering group or individual
health insurance coverage shall, at a minimum provide coverage for and shall
not impose any cost sharing requirement for— (4) with respect to women,
such additional preventive care and screenings not described in paragraph (1)
as provided for in comprehensive guidelines supported by the Health
Resources and Services Administration. . .
42 U.S.C.S. § 300gg-13(a)(4) (2010). Because the statute is silent regarding what the
guidelines are or how the Health Resources and Service Administration (“HRSA”) must
create them, the Court found that Congress intended to empower the HRSA with
“virtually unbridled discretion” to make determinations regarding what is a
preventative care screening that must be required. Little Sister of the Poor, 140 S. Ct. at
2380–81; but see id. at 2404–07 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting) (arguing that the text of the
ACA does not authorize a blanket exemption).
77. Little Sisters of the Poor, 140 S. Ct. at 2385 (majority opinion) (concluding that
the plain text of the statute is illustrative of congressional intent to give broad
discretion to the departments to define preventive care and provide exemptions). The
dissent rests its disagreement “on the basic principle” of law that although “the
Government may ‘accommodate religion beyond free exercise requirements’, when it
does so, it may not benefit religious adherents at the expense of the rights of third
parties.” Id. at 2048 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing Cutter, 544 U.S. at 713). The
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viewed as a strong endorsement of the values set forth in the RFRA. 78
Scholars have recognized that Bostock’s expansion of Title VII
safeguards coupled with Little Sisters of the Poor’s endorsement of
religious exemptions is illustrative of the Court attempting to
compromise in the seemingly inevitable “clash between ever expanding
nondiscrimination protections for LGBTQ79 Americans and the rights of
people of faith to live according to that faith.”80

C. Judicial Creation and Development of the Ministerial
Exception
The ministerial exception developed out of concern for how Title VII
may impact the separation of church and state.81 It is based on religious
liberty principles rooted in the Free Exercise and Establishment
Clauses.82 Two religious liberty concepts are fundamental to why the
exception exists: a historical desire to have religious entities be free to
control their own ministers and a general concern of excessive
entanglement of church and state if a court were to adjudicate issues
involving religion.83 Thus, under the ministerial exception, religious
organizations are granted immunity from several kinds of suits, including
Title VII suits brought by ministerial employees for discrimination based
on sex, race, and national origin.84 Because the exception operates as an
affirmative defense to Title VII claims, an employee who qualifies as a
minister is unable to litigate an otherwise viable claim for
discrimination.85
dissent also points out that the “expansive religious exemption . . . imposes significant
burdens on women.” Id. at 2048. The Government estimated that “[b]etween 70,500
and 126,400 women” would immediately lose access to no-cost contraceptive services
if the exception was upheld. Id. Ultimately, however, the majority dismisses the
dissenter’s concern as one of mere policy that “cannot justify supplanting the text’s
plain meaning.” Id. at 2381 (majority opinion).
78. Tracey, supra note 69, at 128 (observing that Little Sisters of the Poor was the
first time the Court addressed the circuit split surrounding whether the RFRA should
be available as a claim or defense); see generally Little Sisters of the Poor, 140 S. Ct. at
2383 (acknowledging that it was appropriate for the departments to consider the
RFRA when formulating the religious exemption, but declining to explicitly answer
whether the RFRA was sufficient, independent authority to do so).
79. LGBTQ is commonly used as an umbrella term for sexuality and gender identity.
Emanuella Grinberg, What the ‘Q’ in LGBTQ Stands For, And Other Identity Terms
Explained, CNN (Jun. 14, 2019), www.cnn.com/interactive/2019/06/health/lgbtqexplainer/ [perma.cc/H6RD-35W7]. LGBTQ stands for lesbian, gay, bisexual,
transgender, and queer or questioning. Id.
80. Tracey, supra note 69, at 106.
81. Corbin, supra note 20, at 1972.
82. Laura L. Coon, Employment Discrimination by Religious Institutions: Limiting the
Sanctuary of the Constitutional Ministerial Exception to Religion-Based Employment
Decisions, 54 VAND. L. REV. 481, 500 (2001); U.S. CONST. amend. I.
83. See McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1972) (creating the
ministerial exception).
84. Coon, supra note 82, at 502.
85. Allison R. Ferraris, Ministerial Exception After our Lady of Guadalupe School v.
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In 1972, the Fifth Circuit was the first to create and apply such an
exception.86 Billie B. McClure, a fully trained and commissioned officer at
the Salvation Army, filed suit alleging that the Salvation Army violated
Title VII when it paid her less than similarly situated male officers, offered
her fewer benefits than similarly situated male officers, and terminated
her for complaining to her superiors and the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission about these practices.87 Because the Salvation
Army is a religious organization88 and McClure served as a “minister” to
their organization,89 Title VII did not apply, and the court dismissed all of
McClure’s claims.90 With this ruling, the Fifth Circuit created the
ministerial exception that is employed by courts today.91
Since McClure, every federal court of appeals and several state
supreme courts have adopted similar exceptions.92 Under the ministerial
exception, courts have found that religious organizations are immune
from Title VII claims even when the lawsuit does not directly implicate
religious issues.93 Moreover, although McClure made it clear that religious
Morrissey-Berru, 62 B.C. L. REV. E. SUPP. 280, 281 (2021).
86. Corbin, supra note 20, at 1973 (discussing McClure).
87. McClure, 460 F.2d at 555.
88. Id. at 556. Drawing on several court decisions that recognize the Salvation
Army’s status as a religious organization, the district court had previously found that
the Salvation Army was a religious organization. See id. at 556 n.5 (citing Salvation
Army v. United States, 138 F. Supp. 914, 915 (S.D. N.Y. 1956); Bennett v. City of
LaGrange, 112 S.E. 482, 485 (Ga. 1922); Hull v. State, 22 N.E. 117, 117 (Ind. 1889)). The
Salvation Army’s status as a religious organization was not at issue on appeal. McClure,
460 F.2d at 556.
89. Id. at 556. The district court reasoned that because McClure’s responsibilities
“. . . were connected with carrying on of the religious activities of the Salvation Army,”
the Salvation Army was exempt from Title VII. Id. Though the Court of Appeals applied
the ministerial exception in a somewhat different manner, McClure’s status as a
minister was not at issue on appeal. Id.
90. The Fifth Circuit set out that:
[a]pplication of the provisions of Title VII to the employment relationship
which exists between The Salvation Army and Mrs. McClure, a church and its
minister, would involve an investigation and review of these practices and
decisions and would, as a result, cause the State to intrude upon matters of
church administration and government which have so many times before been
proclaimed to be matters of a singular ecclesiastical concern.
Id. at 560.
91. Corbin, supra note 20, at 1974 (demonstrating that McClure created the
ministerial exception); Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 196 (citing to McClure for the
proposition that the ministerial exception had been around for over forty years before
the Supreme Court addressed the issue).
92. Of Priests, Pupils, and Procedure: The Ministerial Exception as a Cause of Action
for On-Campus Student Ministries, 133 HARV. L. REV. 599, 599 (2019).
93. See, e.g., Martin v. SS Columba-Brigid Catholic Church, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
144616, at *20–21 (W.D.N.Y. Aug. 11, 2022) (dismissing a Choir Director’s claim for
race discrimination because the Court believed that she held a ministerial role that
they could not interfere with); Rweyemamu v. Cote, 520 F.3d 198, 209 (2d Cir. 2008)
(holding that the ministerial exception barred plaintiff’s claim of race discrimination).
Because Rweyemamu was a priest in the Catholic Church, the court quickly found that
the ministerial exception applied, as his responsibilities were intertwined with the
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organizations should be afforded a certain degree of independence in
ministerial employment decisions, lower courts have grappled with how
to decide who qualified as a “minister.”94 The inquiry focused on the
function of a position, rather than traditional beliefs on who is or is not a
minister.95 Most courts generally asked whether the employee’s primary
duties involve carrying out some aspect of the employer’s religious
mission.96 Such an inquiry aimed to “preserve the independence of
religious institutions in performing their spiritual religious functions”
while ensuring religious organizations are not immune from federal antidiscrimination law.97 The lack of certainty surrounding how to apply the
exception has led to most claims being barred, even when brought by
employees who had little to do with the religious aspect of an
organization.98

D. Supreme Court Endorsement of the Ministerial Exception
The Supreme Court finally addressed the ministerial exception
doctrine and its constitutional underpinnings in 2012 through HosannaTabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC.99 Hosanna-Tabor
was an Evangelical Lutheran Church that operated a small school in
Redford, Michigan.100 Cheryl Perich was an elementary teacher at
Hosanna-Tabor.101 After her fifth year of teaching at Hosanna-Tabor,
Church. Id. See also Alicea-Hernandez v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 320 F.3d 698, 700 (7th
Cir. 2003) (holding that the ministerial exception barred plaintiff’s claim of
discrimination based on national origin). Alicea-Hernandez served as the Hispanic
Communications Managers, which required her to complete press secretarial duties.
Id. at 703. The Seventh Circuit addressed the novel question of whether the ministerial
exception should apply to press secretaries. Id. at 704. Because a press secretary is
“responsible for conveying the message of an organization to the public,” the court
found that the position serves as a “ministerial function for the church.” Id. Thus, her
claim for racial discrimination was barred by the ministerial exception. Id.
94. Patsakis, 339 F. Supp. 2d at 694 (indicating that “[a]lthough the phrase
‘ministerial exception’ would seem to apply to clergy, several courts have extended the
doctrine to claims of lay employees . . .”).
95. EEOC v. Roman Catholic Diocese, 213 F.3d 795, 801 (4th Cir. 2000); Young v.
Northern Ill. Conference of United Methodist Church, 21 F.3d 184, 186 (7th Cir. 1994).
96. Crunk, supra note 22, at 1087 (revealing that courts are “hardly uniform” when
applying the ministerial exception).
97. EEOC v. Roman Catholic Diocese, 213 F.3d at 801.
98. See, e.g., Alicea-Hernandez, 320 F.3d 698 (barring communication manager’s
claim of sex discrimination); Miller v. Bay View United Methodist Church, Inc., 141 F.
Supp. 2d 1174, 1181 (E.D. Wis. 2001) (barring a choir director’s claim of racial
discrimination); EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455, 457 (1996) (barring a law
faculty member’s claim of sex discrimination); see also Rayburn v. Gen. Conference of
Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1169 (4th Cir. 1985) (expressing that the
ministerial exception extends to any employee who serves in a position that “is
important to the spiritual and pastoral mission of the church.”).
99. Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 171.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 178. The school classified teachers into two categories: called and lay.
Id. at 177. Called teachers were those thought to have “been called to their vocation by
God through a congregation.” Id. Lay teachers were appointed by the school board and

2022]

Piercing the Ministerial Exception

87

Perich was diagnosed with narcolepsy and had to take disability leave for
part of the following school year.102 Almost immediately, Hosanna-Tabor
filled her position and asked her to resign.103 When she refused to resign
and attempted to go back to work with medical clearance, Hosanna-Tabor
fired her.104 Perich filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission, alleging that she was discriminated against because of her
disability.105
Hosanna-Tabor moved for summary judgment and argued that all of
Perich’s claims were barred due to the ministerial exception. 106 For the
ministerial exception to apply, “the employer must be a religious
institution and the employee must have been a ministerial employee.” 107
Both parties agreed that as a religiously affiliated school, Hosanna-Tabor
was a “religious institution” for the purposes of the exception. 108 Thus, the
primary question in Hosanna-Tabor was whether Perich qualified as a
ministerial employee.109
Along with the historical context in which the First Amendment was
drafted, the Court looked at the extensive precedent set by the lower
courts to determine how far the ministerial exception should reach.110
The Court’s ruling built on several lower court decisions and used four
factors to determine whether an employee qualified as a minister. 111
These factors were Perich’s title, whether Perich had religious training or
commissioning, whether Perich held herself out as a minister, and
whether Perich’s job responsibilities reflected a role in conveying the
employer’s religious message and mission. 112 Under this analysis, the
Court found that Perich was a minister and dismissed all of her claims. 113
By expanding the ministerial exception to bar an elementary teacher’s
claim of discrimination based on medical disability, Hosanna-Tabor
upheld the exception’s validity and reaffirmed a religious organization’s
right to act in accordance with their religious beliefs.114
had no duty to be religious. Id. Perich began her career as a lay teacher and was
eventually promoted to called. Id.
102. Id. at 178.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 179.
105. EEOC v. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch., 582 F. Supp. 2d
881, 883 (E.D. Mich. 2008).
106. Id. at 886. At this point in time, the Michigan Court of Appeals had
acknowledged the ministerial exception in their own jurisprudence. See Weishuhn v.
Catholic Diocese, 279 Mich. App. 150, 152 (2008) (concluding, for the first time, that
“the ministerial exception exists in Michigan.”).
107. Hollins v. Methodist Healthcare, Inc., 474 F.3d 223, 225 (6th Cir. 2007).
108. EEOC v. Hosanna-Tabor, 582 F. Supp. 2d at 887.
109. Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 179.
110. See id. at 188 n.2 (citing to cases indicating that the ministerial exception had
been addressed by each circuit court).
111. David E. Schwartz & Risa M. Salins, Supreme Court Review: LGBTQ Rights,
Ministerial Exemption, Contraception, N.Y. L. J. (Aug. 6, 2020).
112. Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 191–93.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 188 (validating the ministerial exception for the first time); See generally
Ioanna Tourkochoriti, Revisiting Hosanna-Tabor v. EEOC: The Road Not Taken, 49 TULSA
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Hosanna-Tabor was almost immediately criticized by scholars as a
“profound misinterpretation of the First Amendment.”115 While the Court
stated it intended to grant a “special solicitude”116 to religious
organizations, some commentators viewed the decision as giving
religious groups a “special freedom to disobey the law.” 117 Moreover, the
Hosanna-Tabor decision provided little guidance on how far the exception
should reach.118 The Court stated that it did not intend for its analysis to
create a “rigid formula” for determining whether an employee falls within
the exception.119 Thus, Hosanna-Tabor still left open the question of what
factors should apply when determining if a position should qualify for the
ministerial exception.120 Following Hosanna-Tabor, district courts
continued to have complete discretion in determining whether an
employee qualifies as a minister.121 This lack of clarity led to several
claims of employees being barred, despite the employees holding no real
relation to the religious operations of an organization.122
The Supreme Court addressed the scope of the ministerial exception
for a second time in Our Lady of Guadalupe v. Morrissey-Berru.123 As in
Hosanna-Tabor, this case involved employment discrimination claims
brought by elementary school teachers.124 The first teacher, MorriseyBerru, filed an age discrimination suit against her employer after being
terminated and replaced with a younger teacher.125 Utilizing the factors
identified in Hosanna-Tabor, the Ninth Circuit found that Morissey-Berru
was not a minister for purposes of the ministerial exception because her
title of “teacher” was secular, and she did not have religious credentials,
training, background, or reputation.126
Kristen Biel, the second teacher involved, was terminated from her
L. REV. 47, 47 (2013) (reporting that in Hosanna-Tabor, the Supreme Court decided to
endorse the ministerial exception after “balancing between the competing rights of
freedom of religion…and the rights of the disabled to equal treatment.”).
115. Leslie C. Griffin, The Sins of Hosanna-Tabor, 88 IND. L. J. 981, 983 (2013)
(contending that “the Court mistakenly protected religious institutions’ religious
freedom at the expense of their religious employees.”).
116. Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 189.
117. Griffin, supra note 115, at 984 (criticizing Hosanna-Tabor for giving applying
a “lawless interpretation of the religious clauses.”).
118. Hinkle, supra note 26, at 288 (exposing Hosanna-Tabor for “add[ing] even
more confusion to the issue” of who will be considered a minister for the purpose of
applying the ministerial exception).
119. Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 190.
120. Leslie C. Griffin, A Word of Warning from a Woman: Arbitrary, Categorical, and
Hidden Religious Exemptions Threaten LGBT Rights, 7 ALA. C.R. & C.L. L REV. 97, 116
(2015).
121. Griffin, supra note 115, at 1006.
122. See, e.g., Skrzypczak v. Roman Catholic Diocese, 611 F.3d 1238 (10th Cir.
2010) (dismissing claims of guidance counselor); Zaleuke v. Archdiocese of St. Louis,
2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 214496 (E.D. Mo. 2021) (dismissing claims of school principal).
123. Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch. v. Morrissey-Berru, 140 S. Ct. 2049, 2055 (2020).
124. Id. at 2055.
125. Id. at 2058.
126. Morrissey-Berru v. Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch., 769 F. App’x 460, 461 (9th
Cir. 2019).
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position as an elementary school teacher after requesting a leave of
absence to seek breast cancer treatment.127 Biel filed suit against the
Catholic school that employed her alleging that she was discriminated
against because of disability.128 The Ninth Circuit once again used the
factors set forth in Hosanna-Tabor and found that Biel was not a minister
for the purposes of the exception.129 The religious organizations in the
cases filed a petition for certiorari, which the Court granted, consolidating
the two cases.130
The Supreme Court reversed the decisions of the Ninth Circuit,
holding that both teachers were ministers because they educated their
students in the Catholic Faith.131 Thus, both Morrisey-Berru’s claim for
age discrimination and Biels’ claim for disability discrimination were
dismissed despite the substantive claims having nothing to do with their
employers’ religious beliefs.
In deciding Our Lady of Guadalupe, the Court rejected the application
of the Hosanna-Tabor factors and instead regressed back to a vague
inquiry that focuses on what an employee does.132 As the dissenters
pointed out, by applying the exception to two elementary school teachers
who had few religious responsibilities at their respective schools, this
decision effectively immunizes religious organizations from any potential
discrimination suit, regardless of whether a case genuinely raises
religious liberty concerns.133 Not only does the exception have potential
to bar all kinds of discrimination claims, but the exception now has the
potential to apply to all employees, religious or secular.

E. Ministerial Exception & Hostile Work Environment Claims
Among the types of claims that have been barred following the Our
Lady of Guadalupe decision are hostile work environment claims. 134

127. Biel v. St. James Sch., 911 F.3d 603, 605 (9th Cir. 2018).
128. Id. at 606.
129. Id. at 611 (expressing that “we cannot read Hosanna-Tabor to exempt from
federal employment law all those who intermingle religious and secular duties . . .”)
(citing Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 196)).
130. Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch. v. Morrissey-Berru, 140 S. Ct. 679, 679 (2019)
(consolidating cases).
131. Our Lady of Guadalupe, 140 S. Ct. 2049, 2069 (rationalizing that “[w]hen a
school with a religious mission entrusts a teacher with the responsibility of educating
and forming students in the faith, judicial intervention into disputes between the
school and the teacher threatens the school’s independence in a way that the First
Amendment does not allow.”).
132. Id. at 2064 (announcing that “what matters, at bottom, is what an employee
does.”).
133. See id. at 2072 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (condemning the majority for giving
employers “free rein to discriminate because of race, sex, pregnancy, age, disability, or
other traits protected by law when selecting or firing their “ministers,” even when the
discrimination is wholly unrelated to the employer’s religious beliefs.”) (citing
Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 194-195)).
134. See, e.g., Demkovich II, 3 F.4th at 985 (holding “the ministerial exception
precludes Demkovich’s hostile work environment claims against the church.”).
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Under Title VII, individuals can state a claim for harassment in the
workplace.135 These allegations must assert that an employer created a
“hostile work environment” that negatively affected conditions of an
employee’s employment.136 Notably, not all harassment is illegal under
Title VII.137 To prevail on a hostile work environment claim, an individual
must show that the workplace was permeated with “discriminatory
intimidation, ridicule, and insult” so “severe or pervasive” that it
negatively impacted the working environment.138 Crucially, the
discrimination must also be rooted in an employee’s protected class.139
The theory of hostile work environment was first recognized by the
Court in 1986 and continues to be well-accepted and applied.140 By
reading Title VII expansively to encompass a ban on workplace
harassment, courts can address invidious discrimination in all
employment matters, not just hiring and firing decisions.141 Hostile work
environment claims have allowed many employees to recover damages
from abusive employers.142 In wake of the Our Lady of Guadalupe decision,
however, these rights have not been afforded to individuals employed by
religious organizations.143

F. The Adjudication of Demkovich’s Claims
In July of 2021, one year after Our Lady of Guadalupe was decided,
the Seventh Circuit144 invoked the Supreme Court’s broad endorsement
135. See Richard D. Glovsky, Practice Note, Harassment Claim Prevention and
Defense (LexisNexis Aug. 3, 2022); Demkovich II, 3 F.4th at 977 (announcing that the
elements for a hostile work environment under the ADA and Title VII are the same);
Meritor, 477 U.S. at 64 (declaring that Title VII claims are not limited to tangible and
economic discrimination).
136. Glovsky, supra note 135.
137. Id.
138. Harris, 510 U.S. at 21 (citing Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65).
139. Eric Bachman, The Differences Between Workplace Bullying and a “hostile work
environment”, FORBES (Aug. 11, 2020), www.forbes.com/sites/ericbachman/
2020/08/11/the-differences-between-workplace-bullying-and-a-hostile-workenvironment/ [perma.cc/XCQ7-CKF8].
140. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 66; see also Jamar, supra note 68, at 738-741
(recapitulating the development of hostile work environment claims).
141. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 523 U.S. 75, 81-82 (1998) (finding
that sex discrimination consisting of same-sex sexual harassment is actionable under
Title VII because it addresses discriminatory “conditions of employment.”).
142. Bachman, supra note 139 (spotlighting several large verdicts, including an
$11.6 million verdict against the New York Knicks).
143. See, e.g., Martin v. SS Columba-Brigid Catholic Church, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
144616 at *25 (W.D.N.Y. 2022) (dismissing Choir director’s complaint for racial
discrimination).
144. Prior to the publication of the Supreme Court’s decision in Our Lady of
Guadalupe, a three-judge panel of the Seventh Circuit heard oral arguments on St.
Andrew’s interlocutory appeal. Demkovich I, 973 F.3d at 718 (7th Cir. 2007) (affirming
in part and reversing in part the decision of the district court). In a 2-1 decision, the
Seventh Circuit flat-out rejected the Church’s proposition of a categorical bar,
explaining that “[t]he First Amendment does not require complete immunity from the
sometimes horrific abuse that defendants’ bright-line rule would protect.” Id.
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of the ministerial exception and barred all claims brought by Sandor
Demokovich, the beloved choir director at St. Andrew the Apostle
Parish.145 Demokovich brought two types of hostile work environment
claims: a claim based on his sex, sexual orientation, and marital status
(hereafter “sexual orientation claim”) and a claim based on his disability
status (hereafter “disability claim”).146 The district court originally
employed a balancing test to determine if each respective claim of hostile
work environment should be barred.147 The primary focus of the court’s
inquiry was whether the claim raised concerns of the excessive
entanglement of church and state.148 Under this approach, the district
court dismissed Demkovich’s sexual orientation claim while allowing his
disability claim to survive.149
The key distinction was that the Archdiocese asserted a religious
justification for harassing Demokovich because of his sexual orientation,
but they provided no religious justification for harassing Demokovich

145. The Seventh Circuit synthesized Hosanna-Tabor and Our Lady of Guadalupe as
follows:
From Hosanna-Tabor and Our Lady of Guadalupe, we take two principles. First,
although these cases involved allegations of discrimination in termination,
their rationale is not limited to that context. The protected interest of a
religious organization in its ministers covers the entire employment
relationship, including hiring, firing, and supervising in between. Second, we
cannot lose sight of the harms—civil intrusion and excessive entanglement—
that the ministerial exception prevents. Especially in matters of civil
employment, the First Amendment thus “gives special solicitude to the rights
of religious organizations.”
Demkovich II, 3 F.4th at 976–77 (citing Our Lady of Guadalupe, 140 S. Ct. at 2060–61,
2069; Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 187–89,194–96).
146. Demkovich II, 3 F.4th at 973.
147. Demkovich v. St. Andrew the Apostle Par., 343 F. Supp. 3d 772, 785 (N.D. Ill.
2018). At this point, the district court had previously ruled on a motion to dismiss and
found that Demokovich qualified as a minister for the purpose of the exception. Id. at
778 (citing Demkovich v. St. Andrew the Apostle Par., 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 161658
(N.D. Ill. 2017)). The district court was now tasked to determine whether the exception
acted as a categorical bar to hostile work environment claims, which “seek relief only
for harassment that did not result in a tangible employment action.” Demkovich, 343 F.
Supp. 3d at 778. The district court held that claims based on tangible employment
actions, such as hiring and firing decision, were categorically barred; claims based on
intangible employment actions, such as discriminatory remarks and insult, were not.
Id. at 778–86. Thus, the ministerial exception did not categorically bar either one of
Demkovich’s hostile work environment claims. Id. at 783–86. The Seventh Circuit later
expanded on this reasoning, clarifying that “[s]ubjecting plaintiff to the abuse alleged
here is neither statutorily permissible nor constitutionally protected means of ‘control’
within the meaning of Hosanna-Tabor.” Demkovich I, 973 F.3d at 729 rev’d en banc,
Demkovich II, 3 F.4th at 985.
148. Demkovich, 343 F. Supp. 3d at 785 (debriefing that a case-by-case analysis
allows federal courts to evaluate whether “an employee’s particular case would pose
too much of an intrusion into the religious employer’s Free Exercise and Establishment
clause rights” rather than categorically barring all claims exclusively due to minister
status).
149. Id. at 789.
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because of his disability. 150 The Archdiocese’s religious justification for
the derogatory remarks and harassment relating to Demkovich’s sexual
orientation claims was that they “reflect the pastor’s opposition, in accord
with Catholic doctrine, to same sex marriage.”151 The court acknowledged
that whether Catholicism mandates an opposition to same-sex marriage
is not subject to court scrutiny, but ultimately found that such opposition
is commonly known and accepted.152 Thus, because analyzing the
religious justification for harassment based on sexual orientation would
inevitably present an excessive-entanglement153 concern due to the
religious justification offered, the court dismissed his sexual orientation
claim.154
On the church’s motion for interlocutory appeal, the Seventh Circuit
was asked to revisit the question of whether the ministerial exception
categorically barred all claims of hostile work environment, including
Demkovich’s disability claim.155 In a divided ruling, the Seventh Circuit
originally found that Demkovich’s hostile work environment claims
should not be barred by the ministerial exception.156 Rather, the Seventh
Circuit held that the proper balance between First Amendment
protections and individual liberties can be found by “bar[ring] claims by
ministerial employees challenging tangible employment actions but
allow[ing] hostile work environment claims . . .”157 This is because “hostile
150. Id. at 786–89.
151. Id. at 786 (citing Defendant’s Reply Brief at 5).
152. See generally James M. Oleske, Jr., The Evolution of Accommodation: Comparing
the Unequal Treatment of Religious Objections to Interracial and Same-Sex Marriages,
50 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 99, 102-104 (2015) (exploring why the legal field readily
accepts and adopts broad religious exemptions relating to same-sex marriage despite
historically rejecting similar exceptions for interracial marriage when both issues
were equally pervasive).
153. Courts have interpreted the First Amendment religion clauses as a prohibition
on “excessive government entanglement with religion.” Kenneth F. Ripple, The
Entanglement Test of the Religion Clauses—A Ten Year Assessment, 27 UCLA L. REV.
1195, 1197 (1980) (citing Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)). To
determine if an excessive entanglement risk is present, the district court employed the
three-part Lemon test. Demkovich, 343 F. Supp. 3d. at 785. The test is as follows:
First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second its principal
or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion;
finally, the statute must not foster an excessive government entanglement with
religion.
Id. (citing Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
154. Demkovich, 343 F. Supp. 3d. at 787 (appreciating that when “no religious
justification is offered at all. . .there would be little or no risk of violating the Free
Exercise Clause.”).
155. Demkovich II, 3 F.4th at 974 (identifying the certified question for review as
“[u]nder Title VII and the Americans with Disabilities Act, does the ministerial
exception ban all claims of hostile work environment brought by a plaintiff who
qualifies as a minister, even if the claim does not challenge a tangible employment
action?”).
156. Demkovich I, 973 F.3d at 720.
157. Id. (adding that “[r]eligious employers’ control over tangible employment
actions . . . provides ample protection for the free exercise of religion.”).
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[work] environment claims are essentially tortious in nature” and are
“not essential to the management and supervision and control of
employees.”158 As such, both Demkovich’s sexual orientation claim and
disability claim were allowed to proceed.159
The Seventh Circuit sitting en banc reversed this decision entirely,
finding that all adjudication of “allegations of minister-on-minister
harassment would not only undercut a religious organization’s
constitutionally protected relationship with its ministers, but also cause
civil intrusion into, and excessive entanglement with, the religious
sphere.”160 Through this decision, the Seventh Circuit effectively gave
religious organizations a license to harass under the guise of religious
freedom, even when religious concerns are not genuinely at issue. 161
As the dissent pointed out, the Seventh Circuit did not have to adopt
a categorical bar.162 The dissenters stated four reasons as to why the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals should have ruled the other way: 1) the
Supreme Court has yet to rule on the application of the ministerial
exception in the context of hostile work environment claims, 2) circuit
and state courts are split on the issue, 3) the majority’s rule “draws an
odd, arbitrary line in constitutional law,” and 4) “the line between
tangible employment actions and hostile work environments fits the
purpose of the ministerial exception.”163 In the dissenters’ view, these
four reasons should have led the court to “weigh competing interests
case-by-case to protect both religious liberty and laws against
employment discrimination” rather than imposing a categorical bar. 164

158. Id. at 727–28. In this opinion, the Seventh Circuit repeatedly emphasized how
hostile work environment claims are more akin to torts or breaches of conduct, and
not relevant to an employer’s right to control. Id. at 728. As they wrote: “Supervisors
within religious organizations have no constitutionally protected individual rights
under Hosanna—Tabor to abuse those employees they manage, whether or not they
are motivated by their personal religious beliefs.” Id. at 730.
159. Id. at 736. While the opinion was issued in August, 2020, oral arguments for
Demkovich I were heard in November, 2019, and the decision for Our Lady of
Guadalupe was not published until July 2020. Id. at 718; Our Lady of Guadalupe, 140 S.
Ct. at 2049. Consequently, the Seventh Circuit’s en banc decision in Demkovich II was
argued against a different background than its predecessor.
160. Id. at 977–78 (cautioning that judicial involvement in Demkovich’s case would
“depart from Hosanna-Tabor and Our Lady of Guadalupe and threaten the
independence of religious organizations ‘in a way that the First Amendment does not
allow.’”) (citing Our Lady of Guadalupe, 140 S. Ct. at 2069).
161. See e.g. Starkey, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 158254 at *2 (barring elementary
teacher’s claim of hostile work environment relating to her sexual orientation);
Fitzgerald v. Roncalli High Sch., 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 194411 at *5 (S.D. Ind. Sep. 30,
2021) (recognizing that “in light of the Seventh Circuit’s ruling in Demkovich v. St.
Andrew the Apostle Par., Calumet City, 3 F.4th 968 (7th Cir. 2021), all of Fitzgerald’s
claims will be barred if the ministerial exception applies.”).
162. Demkovich II, 3 F.4th 968, 985 (Hamilton, J., dissenting).
163. Id. at 987–90.
164. Id. at 985 (characterizing this as the “more cautious” approach).
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III. ANALYSIS
To decipher the Seventh Circuit’s decision to bar all of Demkovich’s
claims, this section examines the analytical framework under which
Demkovich’s claims were adjudicated. First, this section lays out the
federal circuit split on whether hostile work environment claims brought
by a ministerial employee are categorically barred under the ministerial
exception.165 Then, this section shares different perspectives on whether
hostile work environment claims are unique employment disputes that
warrant further consideration by the courts. Finally, this section
considers whether hostile work environment claims are like other civil
disputes in a way that would permit courts to inquire into their merits
without raising religious liberty concerns.

A. Federal Circuit Split
Notably, before the Seventh Circuit considered Demkovich’s case,
“[o]nly two courts of appeals ha[d] addressed whether hostile work
environment claims brought by a minister are barred by the ministerial
exception [and t]he courts have come to opposite conclusions.” 166 On one
hand, the Tenth Circuit applied a categorical bar to all hostile work
environment claims brought by a ministerial employee.167 On the other
hand, the Ninth Circuit used a case-by-case balancing approach to
determine whether a hostile work environment claim brought by a
ministerial employee can proceed.168 The Sixth Circuit has since had the
opportunity to weigh in on this issue, yet declined to do so. 169
1.

The Tenth Circuit Approach: A Categorical Bar

The Seventh Circuit en banc majority joined the Tenth Circuit in
finding that that the ministerial exception bars all Title VII claims,
including those for hostile work environment.170 In 2007, Monica
Skrzypczak, the director of the Department of Religious Formation for the
Roman Catholic Diocese of Tulsa, filed suit against the Diocese, alleging

165. Compare Skrzypczak, 611 F.3d at 1245–46 (holding that the ministerial
exception categorically bars all hostile work environment claims), with Bollard v.
California Province of the Soc'y of Jesus, 196 F.3d 940, 948 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding
that the court should engage in a case-by-case analysis before deciding whether to
apply the ministerial exception).
166. Demkovich, 343 F. Supp. 3d at 783.
167. See Skrzypczak, 611 F.3d at 1245–46.
168. See Bollard, 196 F.3d at 947 (9th Cir. 1999).
169. Middleton v. United Church of Christ Bd., 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 34852 *10 (6th
Cir. 2021) (acknowledging the circuit split on whether the ministerial exception
categorically bars courts from considering a minister's hostile-work-environment
claims). The Sixth Circuit declined to address the merits of this debate because the
Plaintiff did not state a sufficient claim for hostile work environment on its face. Id.
170. Skrzypczak, 611 F.3d at 1245–46.
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gender discrimination and a hostile work environment.171 Because
Skrzypczak’s job responsibilities “furthered the core spiritual mission of
the Diocese,” the court had no issue finding that she was a minister for the
purposes of the exception.172 Skrzypczak argued that even though she
qualified as a minister, her Title VII claim for hostile work environment
should not be barred because it did not involve a protected employment
decision.173 The Tenth Circuit flatly rejected this argument, concluding
that “any Title VII action brought against a church by one of its ministers
will improperly interfere with the church . . . .” 174 The Tenth Circuit’s
decision effectively prevents any employee from stating a Title VII claim
against a religious organization, regardless of whether or not the claimed
discrimination has any relationship to the religious organization’s
tenets.175
2.

The Ninth Circuit Approach: A Case-by-Case Analysis

The Ninth Circuit utilizes an entirely different approach when
determining whether to apply the ministerial exception to hostile work
environment claims.176 Instead of applying a categorical bar, the Ninth
Circuit conducts a case-by-case analysis to determine whether religious
liberty is truly at issue.177 If a plaintiff’s claim is determined to involve
171. Id. at 1241.
172. Id. at 1244. Among other things, the Diocese presented the following evidence
regarding Skrzypczk’s ministerial duties: her religious job title, her job description that
included religious duties, employment application statements that indicated her
personal religious beliefs, a list of the multiple religious courses that she taught at the
Diocese’s Pastoral Studies Institute, the Institute’s mission statement to “provide a
solid foundation in Catholic theology to educate, nourish, strengthen, and renew the
Catholic faith”, and an affidavit from a Bishop describing her religious role at the
Institute and as the director of the Department of Religious formation. Id. at 1243.
Skrzypczk attempted to rebut this evidence with three affidavits that concluded her
duties were purely administrative. Id. at 1244. In light of this evidence—particularly
the multiple religious courses taught by Skrzypczak and the religious nature of her job
title and description—the Tenth Circuit found that the Diocese met their burden of
showing that Skrzypczak’s position was “important to the spiritual and pastoral
mission of the [Diocese].” Id. (citing Rayburn v. Gen. Conference of Seventh-Day
Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1169 (4th Cir. 1985)).
173. See Elvig v. Calvin Presbyterian Church, 375 F.3d 951, 959 (9th Cir. 2004)
(permitting a ministerial employee to bring a hostile work environment claim relating
to sexual harassment when no religious justification is offered by the religious
employer).
174. Skrzypczk, 611 F.3d at 1246.
175. See, e.g., Koenke v. Saint Joseph's Univ., 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3576 at *12 (E.D.
Pa. 2021) (dismissing all claims brought by an Assistant Director for Music and
Worship at a private Catholic University); Lishu Yin v. Columbia Int'l Univ., 335 F. Supp.
3d 803, 806 (D.S.C. 2018) (dismissing all claims brought by a full-time faculty member
at Columbia International University, a “multi-denominational Christian institution of
higher education.”).
176. See Alcazar v. Corp. of Catholic Archbishop of Seattle, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
92708 at *9 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 21, 2006) (addressing whether the ministerial exception
bars a claim for hostile work environment).
177. See, e.g., Bollard, 196 F.3d at 940; Elvig, 375 F.3d at 951.
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purely secular issues, the claim is able to survive.178 Thus, this approach
addresses concerns of excessive entanglement between church and state
while simultaneously ensuring anti-discrimination safeguards are in
place.179
The case of John Bollard is a clear example of this balance.180 In 1988,
John Bollard served as a novice of the Society of Jesus, an order of Roman
Catholic priests commonly known as Jesuits.181 As a novice, Bollard
underwent an extensive training process with the goal of becoming an
ordained priest.182 Bollard is undoubtedly the exact type of employee the
ministerial exception was intended to cover.183 In his suit against the
religious entity who employed him, Bollard alleged that he was sexually
harassed by his superiors who made unwanted sexual advances and
engaged in inappropriate and unwelcomed sexual discussions. 184 The
Ninth Circuit reasoned that because the Jesuit order offered no religious
justification for the harassment, there was no risk of excessive
entanglement if his suit was allowed to proceed.185 Thus, Bollard’s claims
were not barred by the ministerial exception, despite his clear role as a
minister.186
3.

The Seventh Circuit Joins the Tenth in Adopting a Categorical
Bar

When deciding Demkovich II, the Seventh Circuit acknowledged
both approaches employed by the federal courts regarding whether the
ministerial exception covers hostile work environment claims. 187 As

178. See Alcazar, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92708 at *13.
179. See Morgan Nelson, Discussing Demkovich: An Analysis of Why and How the
Supreme Court Should Reconsider the Expansion of the Ministerial Exception, 54 TEX.
TECH L. REV. 825, 840 (2022) (agreeing that “a two-prong balancing test… protect[s]
ministerial employees while preserving the freedom of religious entities.”).
180. Bollard, 196 F.3d at 944.
181. Id.
182. See generally James Martin, S.J., Novice? Regent? Scholastic? A guide to Jesuit
Formation (and Lingo), AMERICA: THE JESUIT REVIEW (Aug. 11, 2013),
www.americamagazine.org/faith/2013/08/11/novice-regent-scholastic-guidejesuit-formation-and-lingo [perma.cc/EK9K-K2QR] (expounding on the lengthy
formation process required for novices to become ordained).
183. See Katherine Bell, The Ministerial Exception: Rethinking the Third Circuit's
Approach to Ministerial Discrimination, 46 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 753, 756 (2008)
(confirming that “the ministerial exception is derived from the Religion Clauses of the
First Amendment to protect the relationship between the church and clergy.”).
184. Bollard, 196 F.3d at 944. Bollard initially reported his harassment to superiors
in the Jesuit order, but no action was taken. Id. Ultimately, the harassment was so
severe that Bollard left the Jesuit order before taking vows to become a priest. Id.
185. Id. at 947 (noting that because no religious justification was offered, there is
“no danger that, by allowing this suit to proceed, we will thrust the secular courts into
the constitutionally untenable position of passing judgment on questions of religious
faith or doctrine.”).
186. Id. at 948 (pointing out that a “generalized and diffuse concern for church
autonomy, without more, does not exempt them from the operation of secular laws.”).
187. Demkovich II, 3 F.4th at 985 (characterizing their decision as “remov[ing] any
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discussed above, the Seventh Circuit adopted the absolutist approach
utilized by the Tenth Circuit and imposed a categorical bar.188 Per the
Seventh Circuit’s own reasoning, such an adoption was consistent with its
own precedent regarding the application of the exception, along with the
Supreme Court’s “unanimous endorsement” in Hosanna-Tabor.189
The dissent disagreed whole-heartedly.190 The dissenting opinion
characterized Demkovich’s hostile work environment claim as “fall[ing]
squarely into the area that Hosanna-Tabor expressly declined to reach.” 191
According to the dissenters, “the majority’s rule draws an odd, arbitrary
line” that “departs from a long practice of carefully balancing civil law and
religious liberty.”192 Since the Seventh Circuit’s decision to impose an
absolute bar, district courts have refused to hear the claims of several
employees, including two guidance counselors who brought Title VII
hostile work environment claims against their religious employers.193

B. Hostile Work Environment Claims as Unique Employment
Disputes
In most cases where the ministerial exception is applied, a tangible
employment action is being challenged.194 Tangible employment actions
require an official company act.195 Hiring and firing decisions are the
clearest examples.196 It is generally accepted that the ministerial
exception should apply to tangible employment actions because the

doubt as to where we stand” on the application of the ministerial exception).
188. Id. at 983–85 (mentioning several Seventh Circuit decisions pre-dating Our
Lady of Guadalupe that dismissed claims through the application of the ministerial
exception). But see Demkovich I, 973 F.3d at 721 (“In so holding, we join the Ninth
Circuit and depart from the Tenth.”) (internal citations omitted).
189. Demkovich II, 3 F.4th at 985.
190. Id. at 985 (Hamilton J., dissenting) (“By focusing too much on religious liberty
and too little on counterarguments and other interests, the majority opinion takes our
circuit’s law beyond necessary protection of religious liberty.”).
191. Id. at 986 (using language from Hosanna-Tabor to show that the Supreme
Court intended the exception to apply only in situations of termination and
“express[ed] no view on whether the exception bars other types of suits . . .”) (citing
Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 196).
192. Id. at 988–93.
193. Starkey, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 158254 at *2; Fitzgerald, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
194411 at *5; see Zaleuke, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 214496, at *19 (dismissing Plaintiff’s
Title VII discrimination, retaliation, and harassment claim because the parties agreed
that if the ministerial exception applies, it must apply to all claims).
194. Rockwell v. Roman Catholic Archdiocese, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20992, at *1
(D.N.H. 2002) (dismissing claim relating to hiring decision); Fratello v. Archdiocese of
N.Y., 863 F.3d 190, 192 (2d Cir. 2017) (dismissing claim relating to termination);
Gellington v. Christian Methodist Episcopal Church, 203 F.3d 1299, 1300 (11th Cir.
2000) (applying the ministerial exception to a claim for constructive discharge).
195. Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 762 (1998).
196. See Vance v. Ball State Univ., 570 U.S. 421, 428 (2013) (defining a tangible
employment action as “a significant change in employment status, such as hiring,
firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or
a decision causing a significant change in benefits.”) (citing Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 761).
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exception itself is rooted in the belief that churches should be free to
select their own ministers.197
Hostile work environment claims, however, do not require an
official, tangible act on behalf of the employer.198 Rather, employers are
liable when their own negligence is a cause of the harassment or if the
supervisor subsequently takes tangible employment action against the
employee.199 Thus, individuals can prevail on a hostile work environment
claim without showing that a tangible employment action was
involved.200 Advocates have used this distinction to argue that the
ministerial exception should not apply to hostile work environment
claims because they do not directly affect a religious entity’s ability to
select their own ministers.201 For example, in the district court’s
Demkovich decision, the court held that his claims based on tangible
employment actions, such as hiring and firing decisions, were
categorically barred.202 But, his claims based on intangible employment
actions, such as discriminatory remarks and insult, were not.203 Most
courts, however, have been less than receptive to this argument,
including the Seventh Circuit which ultimately reversed the district
court’s decision.204 Still, the Supreme Court’s decisions in Hosanna-Tabor
and Our Lady of Guadalupe, seem to have left this question unanswered.205
1.

Interpretations in Favor of Categorically Barring Hostile Work
Environment Claims

On one hand, district courts have utilized the language in Hosanna-

197. E.g., Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 174 (affirming that “it is impermissible for the
government to contradict a church’s determination of who can act as its ministers.”).
198. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 786 (1998).
199. See Henry L. Chambers, Jr., A Unifying Theory of Sex Discrimination, 34 GA. L.
REV. 1591, 1593 (2000) (perceiving a historical difference between quid pro quo
harassment claims—those that occur when the employee suffers an actual job
detriment—and hostile work environment claims—when the employee suffers no job
detriment).
200. See, e.g., Steinberg v. Hoshijo, 88 Haw. 10, 19 (1998) (finding hostile work
environment existed where a doctor subjected their employee to repeated, unwanted
sexual contact which caused the employee to decide to leave).
201. See, e.g., Koenke, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3576, *7-12 (deconstructing a
minister’s argument that the ministerial exception should not apply to all claims she
brought); Demokivch I, 973 F.3d at 727-730 (expounding on the unique, tortious
nature of hostile work environment claims). From the Seventh Circuit’s perspective,
“[h]ostile environment claims arise under the same statutes, but they involve different
elements and specially tailored rules for employer liability. These differences show
that a religious employer does not need exemption from such claims to be able to
‘select and control’ its ministers.” Id. at 727.
202. Demkovich, 343 F. Supp. 3d 772, 778–86.
203. Id. See also Demkovich I, 973 F.3d at 736 (permitting his hostile work
environment claims to proceed).
204. Koenke, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3576 at *9; Demkovich II, 3 F.4th at 985.
205. See generally Brandenburg v. Greek Orthodox Archdiocese of N. Am., 2021 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 102800 at *13 (S.D.N.Y. 2021) (introducing the Circuit split yet declining
to take sides in the “spirited debate” because the issue was not adequately briefed).
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Tabor and Our Lady of Guadalupe to argue that the Supreme Court
intended the ministerial exception to apply to all aspects of the
employment relationship, tangible and intangible.206 When the Court was
first tasked with recognizing and defining the exception, it agreed with
the lower courts that the ministerial exception precludes Title VII and
other employment discrimination laws from applying “to claims
concerning the employment relationship between a religious institution
and its ministers.”207 In Our Lady of Guadalupe, the Supreme Court further
explained that under the ministerial exception, “courts are bound to stay
out of employment disputes involving those holding certain important
positions with churches and other religious institutions.” 208 Because
these Supreme Court decisions refer to employment decisions broadly,
rather than distinguishing between tangible and intangible employment
actions, district courts have assumed that the ministerial exception is
intended to apply to all employment disputes.209 Therefore, since hostile
work environment claims are always brought in the context of
employment, district courts have ruled that they must be absolutely
banned under the ministerial exception.210
2.

Interpretations Against Categorically Barring Hostile Work
Environment Claims

On the other hand, individuals in favor of allowing hostile work
environment claims to survive the ministerial exception have pointed out
restrictive language used by the Supreme Court in Hosanna-Tabor and
Our Lady of Guadalupe. First, in Hosanna-Tabor, the Court made sure to
hold only that the ministerial exception bars a suit brought on behalf of a
minister challenging the church’s decision to fire her.211 They
“express[ed] no view on whether the exception bars other types of
suits.”212 Utilizing this expressly narrow language, individuals can argue
that Hosanna-Tabor purposefully left open the question of how the court
should treat hostile work environment claims.213
206. Koenke, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3576 at *8 (asserting that “the Supreme Court
expressly held ‘the “ministerial exception” [applies] to laws governing the employment
relationship between a religious institution and [ministerial] employees.’”) (citing Our
Lady of Guadalupe, 140 S. Ct. at 2055).
207. Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 188 (emphasis added).
208. Our Lady of Guadalupe, 140 S. Ct. at 2060 (emphasis added).
209. Koenke, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3576 at *11–12 (holding the ministerial
exception bars claims involving tangible and intangible employment actions).
210. Id. at *9 (noting that “[t]he Supreme Court has not cabined the ministerial
exception to tangible or intangible employment actions, and it is not for this Court to
create such an exception to binding precedent); Id. at *9 n.5 (underscoring that such
an interpretation of the Supreme Court’s precedent is supported by traditional canons
of construction).
211. Hosanna Tabor, 565 U.S. at 196.
212. Id.
213. Demkovich II, 3 F.4th at 986 (Hamilton, J., dissenting) (announcing that
“[b]ecause Demkovich’s amended complaint addresses only his treatment by his
supervisor while he was employed and does not challenge is firing or any other
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Moreover, Our Lady of Guadalupe did little to address this
question.214 In Our Lady of Guadalupe, the majority emphasized that its
decision did “not mean that religious institutions enjoy a general
immunity from secular laws.”215 Instead, their autonomy is protected
“with respect to internal management decisions that are essential to the
institution’s central mission.” 216 Hostile work environment claims do not
require the direct involvement of a managerial employee, let alone the
involvement of an internal management decision.217 Additionally, they
were not explicitly barred by the Supreme Court.218 Therefore, it can be
argued that a categorical bar should not be employed by the lower
courts.219
3.

Hostile Work Environment Claims as Analogous to Other Civil
Disputes

To further support the argument that claims for hostile work
environment should not be categorically barred by the ministerial
exception, advocates point out the well-accepted fact that the First
Amendment does not absolutely shield religious organizations from all
claims brought against them.220 For example, ministerial employees can
assert a breach of contract claim against the religious institution that
employs them.221 Churches can also be held liable for wrongs committed
against parishioners.222 In addition, priests and other ministerial
tangible employment action, it falls squarely into the area that Hosanna-Tabor
expressly declined to reach.”).
214. Id. at 986–87.
215. Our Lady of Guadalupe, 140 S. Ct. at 2060.
216. Id. (elucidating later that “a component of this autonomy is the selection of
individuals who play certain key roles.”).
217. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 70–72 (surveying elements necessary to prove
employer liability).
218. See Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 171 (including no discussion about hostile
work environment claims); Our Lady of Guadalupe, 140 S. Ct. at 2049 (including no
discussion about hostile work environment claims).
219. See, e.g., Kevin J. Murphy, Administering the Ministerial Exception PostHosanna-Tabor: Why Contract Claims Should Not Be Barred, 28 ND J. L. ETHICS & PUB.
POL'Y 383, 386 (2014) (opining that the ministerial exception should not bar wrongful
termination contract claims).
220. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 306 (1940) (justifying that the Court’s
decision to reverse a conviction on freedom of religion grounds did not intend “even
remotely to imply that, under the cloak of religion, person may, with impunity, commit
frauds upon the public.”).
221. Kirby v. Lexington Theological Seminary, 426 S.W.3d 597, 602 (Ky. 2014)
(holding that a ministerial employee’s breach of contract claim survives because the
enforcement of the contractual arrangement did not pose concerns regarding
government interference in the selection of ministers or any other matter of
ecclesiastical concern).
222. Wisniewski v. Diocese of Belleville, 943 N.E.2d 43, 48 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011)
(awarding over five million dollars in damages to a parishioner who was sexually
abused by a priest for several years); see generally BISHOPACCOUNTABILITY.ORG,
www.bishop-accountability.org [perma.cc/6JRK-LNMC] (last visited Aug. 31, 2022)
(collecting information about sex abuse lawsuits against religious organizations).
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employees are not immune from criminal prosecution.223 Simply put, “our
pluralistic society requires religious entities to abide by generally
applicable laws.”224 Adopting a categorical bar for hostile work
environment claims under the ministerial exception goes against this
principle and puts religious organizations above the law, rather than in
compliance.225
Moreover, courts are more than capable of treating hostile work
environment claims like those for breach of contract or any tortious
violation.226 Hostile work environment claims undoubtedly involve a fact
intensive inquiry.227 Courts are asked to consider things such as “the
frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is
physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and
whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work
performance.”228 Though the inquiry will certainly pose some risk of
burdening religious liberty when a religious employer is involved, the risk
posed does not automatically outweigh the risk in other civil claims just
because an employment statute is involved.229 Because some hostile work
environment claims can be resolved with either a purely secular inquiry
or in a manner similar to other permissible civil actions brought against
religious entities, it can be argued that the religious liberty risk associated
with hostile work environment claims is not significant enough to
warrant a categorical bar.230
Opponents to this line of reasoning once again cite the historical
context in which the ministerial exception arose, as well as language
employed by the Supreme Court to assert that hostile work environment
claims are employment decisions covered by the exception.231 In
223. E.g., Alex Finnie & Andrea Torres, Catholic Priest Sentenced to Nearly 8 Years
in
Prison
in
Miami-Dade,
LOCAL
10
NEWS
(Feb.
17,
2022),
www.local10.com/news/local/2022/02/17/catholic-priest-sentenced-to-nearly-8years-in-prison-in-miami-dade/ [perma.cc/J8FU-KJMM] (reporting on a Catholic
priest convicted of sexual battery).
224. Our Lady of Guadalupe, 140 S. Ct. at 2072 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
225. See generally Corbin, supra note 20 (rebutting potential justifications for the
broad immunity granted to religious organizations under the ministerial exception).
226. Demkovich II, 3 F.4th at 988 (Hamilton, J., dissenting) (treating concerns for
protecting religious liberty with skepticism because “churches and their leaders are
already accountable in civil courts for many similar sorts of claims . . . [r]eligious liberty
still thrives.”).
227. Jennifer D. McCollum, Employers' Greatest Enemy: Second-Hand Evidence in
Hostile Work Environment Claims, 59 SMU L. REV. 1869, 1872–73 (2006) (discussing
what is required for an actionable hostile work environment claim).
228. Id. at 1873 (citing Harris, 510 U.S. at 23).
229. See Demkovich II, 3 F.4th at 989 (Hamilton, J., dissenting). The dissent
emphasized that “investigations into tort and criminal liability of supervisors and
churches as institutions cannot avoid looking into a church’s supervision and control
of a ministerial employee.” Id. It acknowledges that “delicate legal questions may
arise,” but ultimately concludes that the investigations should proceed. Id.
230. Alcazar, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92708 at *9 (“[B]ecause the evaluation of a
sexual harassment claim involves an entirely secular inquiry that does not intrude into
areas concerning the doctrines of a religious organization, it is allowed.”).
231. See discussion, supra Section III.B.
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Hosanna-Tabor, the Court specifically declined to address actions brought
“by employees alleging breach of contract or tortious conduct of their
religious employers.”232 Courts have applied a strict textualist
interpretation to the Hosanna-Tabor decision and found that contractbased and tort-based employment claims are the only types of suits
where the application of the exception remains ambiguous.233 Because
there is no explicit indication that hostile work environment claims
should be treated differently than other lawsuits, modern day courts
continue to use the categorical bar that has been historically imposed. 234

IV. PROPOSAL
Applying a categorical bar to all claims for hostile work environment
brought by ministerial employees is inconsistent with our nation’s
history and values surrounding religious liberty and antidiscrimination
law.235 Instead of a categorical bar, district courts should allow a
ministerial employee to rebut a religious employer’s assertion that the
ministerial exception bars their hostile work environment claim. Under
this standard, if a plaintiff can show that an inquiry into their case would
involve purely secular issues, their claim should proceed. This approach
is necessary to protect the state’s well-established interest in keeping
antidiscrimination safeguards in place while also ensuring religious
liberty is not threatened by state intrusion.

A. Categorical Bar is Irreconcilable with the Fundamental
Purpose of the Exception
Absolutely prohibiting all claims of hostile work environment
brought by ministerial employees is a deficient approach that drastically
departs from the underpinnings of why the ministerial exception was
created in the first place.236 Freedom to select its own clergymen is
undoubtedly a right that religious entities have enjoyed in this country. 237

232. Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 196.
233. Koenke, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3576 at *11 (rejecting plaintiff’s argument that
Hosanna-Tabor and Our Lady of Guadalupe left open the question of whether the
exception applied to claims other than those explicitly litigated).
234. Id.; Preece v. Covenant Presbyterian Church, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52751, *17–
19 (D. Neb. 2015); Alicea-Hernandez, 320 F.3d at 703 (reiterating that “[t]he
ministerial exception applies without regard to the type of claims being brought.”).
235. See discussion, supra Part II (analyzing our nation’s history of religious liberty
and how it has become intertwined with employment law).
236. See discussion, supra Section II.C (positing that the ministerial exception was
created out of two concerns: a historical need to have churches be free to select their
own clergymen and a modern concern for avoiding excessive-entanglement issues).
237. Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic Archbishop, 280 U.S. 1, 16 (1929) (finding that
appointment of ministers is a “canonical act” that secular courts should stay out of);
see also Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 185 (collecting cases that “confirm that it is
impermissible for the government to contradict a church’s determination of who can
act as its ministers.”).
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What these entities should not enjoy, however, is the right to harass and
abuse those it employs.
1.

Religious Liberty & Freedom to Select Ministers

The Supreme Court endorsed the ministerial exception because it
was concerned with a religious entity being forced to accept or retain
unwanted ministers.238 Ministers are traditionally viewed as the kind of
individuals who are directly involved in carrying out the religious mission
of a particular organization.239 Religious liberty principals grant religious
organizations a large degree of freedom when carrying out their religious
mission.240 Thus, if churches were forced to hire or unable to fire someone
who was directly carrying out their mission, this would undoubtedly
conflict with religious liberty principles.241 It follows that courts created
the ministerial exception out of concern that forcing religious
organizations to retain ministers against their will would directly impact
an organization’s religious operations in an unconstitutional manner.242
Notably, this historical concern still holds modern day applicability.
For example, the Roman Catholic Church reserves some of its ministerial
roles exclusively for men.243 It is certainly unconstitutional for the state
to interfere with this practice and mandate the Roman Catholic Church to
ordain women as priests.244 But should employees of the Church be able
238.
Requiring a church to accept or retain an unwanted minister, or punishing a
church for failing to do so, intrudes upon more than a mere employment
decision. Such action interferes with the internal governance of the church,
depriving the church of control over the selection of those who will personify
its beliefs. By imposing an unwanted minister, the state infringes the Free
Exercise Clause, which protects a religious group's right to shape its own faith
and mission through its appointments. According the state the power to
determine which individuals will minister to the faithful also violates the
Establishment Clause, which prohibits government involvement in such
ecclesiastical decisions.
Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 173.
239. See Bell, supra note 183, at 758 (designating ministers as “the primary voice
of the church…chosen to spread its religious doctrine to believers.”).
240. See Church of Lukumi Babalue Aye, 508 U.S. at 532-33 (delineating the
fundamental protections of the Free Exercise Clause).
241. See Demkovich I, 973 F.3d at 727 (acknowledging that hiring and firing
decisions clearly fall under the religious organization’s right to “select and control”
their ministers, which is what the ministerial exception aims to protect).
242. McClure, 460 F.2d at 558 (identifying ministers as “the chief instrument by
which the church seeks to fulfill its purpose.”).
243. Elisabetta Povoledo, Pope Formalizes Women’s Roles, but Priesthood Stays Out
of Reach, NY TIMES (Jan. 11, 2021), www.nytimes.com/2021/01/11/world/
europe/pope-women.html [perma.cc/FC4H-5RXV] (emphasizing that although the
Pope has recently expanded the roles that women are formally allowed to hold in the
church, women are still barred from becoming deacons or priests).
244. See, e.g., Rockwell v. Roman Catholic Archdiocese, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14416
at *5–7 (D.N.H. 2002) (dismissing a female plaintiff’s suit against the Catholic Church).
Among other things, Ms. Rockwell alleged that the Catholic Church’s policy of excluding
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to harass their fellow female coworkers daily without state interference?
The obvious answer is no.
Hostile work environment claims do not require religious
employers to hire an employee.245 They do not prevent a religious
employer from firing an employee.246 All hostile work environment
claims do is allow employees to hold their employer accountable when
the workplace is so full of “discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and
insult” to the point that it “alter[s] the conditions of the victim’s
employment and create[s] an abusive working environment.” 247 Thus,
hostile work environment claims are entirely different than the type of
claims that the ministerial exception was designed to protect. 248
2.

Avoiding Other Excessive Entanglement Issues

The ministerial exception also grew from a generalized concern with
excessive-entanglement issues.249 Though a categorical bar on all hostile
work environment claims brought by ministerial employees ensures that
the judiciary will make absolutely no inquiry into how a religious
organization operates, a categorical bar is not the only way to avoid
excessive-entanglement issues. The separation of church and state does
not mandate that the judiciary stay out of the operations of religious
organizations entirely.250 Indeed, courts conduct inquiries into the
operations of a religiously affiliated organization all the time without
violating the First Amendment.251 These inquiries even occur in the
women from priesthood discriminated against her on the basis of gender. Id. at *4. The
court allowed her claim to survive preliminary review, however, it explained that “it is
apparent that the complaint fails to state a cause of action as a result of the [ministerial]
exception.” Id. at *6 n.2.
245. See generally Remedies for Employment Discrimination, U.S. EQUAL EMP.
OPPORTUNITY
COMM’N,
www.eeoc.gov/remedies-employment-discrimination
[perma.cc/93BE-U895] (last accessed Sept. 9, 2022) (outlining potential remedies for
employment discrimination claims).
246. Id. (listing compensatory or punitive damages as the only option).
247. Harris, 510 U.S. at 21 (citing Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65).
248. See Demkovich I, 973 F.3d at 730 (“Supervisors within religious organizations
have no constitutionally protected individual rights under Hosanna—Tabor to abuse
those employees they manage, whether or not they are motivated by their personal
religious beliefs.”).
249. E.g., McClure, 460 F.2d at 560 (creating the ministerial exception out of the
need for the separation of church and state).
250. See generally Robert Joseph Renaud and Lael Daniel Weinberger, Spheres of
Sovereignty: Church Autonomy Doctrine and the Theological Heritage of the Separation
of Church and State, 35 N. KY. L. REV. 67, 68 (2008) (exploring the theological
underpinnings behind the separation of church and state); Johnny Rex Buckles, Does
the Constitutional Norm of Separation of Church and State Justify the Denial of Tax
Exemption to Churches that Engage in Partisan Political Speech?, 84 IND. L.J. 447, 451
(2009) (contending that the separation of church and state does not mandate a ban on
electioneering by churches).
251. See generally, e.g., Soc'y of the Holy Transfiguration Monastery, Inc. v. Gregory,
689 F.3d 29, 35 (1st Cir. 2012) (settling a copyright issue between two monasteries);
Ehrens v. Lutheran Church, 385 F.3d 232, 233 (2d Cir. 2004) (ruling on a sexual assault
complaint filed against a retired minister); Church of Scientology v. Siegelman, 94
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employment context.252 Courts often bifurcate discovery in “ministerial”
cases, which allows the parties to learn necessary information without
overstepping religious boundaries.253 If courts already regulate religious
organizations in the employment context, they are more than capable of
determining whether a hostile work environment claim brought by a
ministerial employee poses a unique excessive entanglement issue.
Simply put, religious organizations have not, and should not, be held
above the law solely because they have a religious affiliation.254 Thus,
courts should not be afraid to conduct an inquiry into the facts
surrounding a ministerial employee’s hostile work environment claim
before determining that excessive-entanglement issues may warrant a
dismissal.
3.

Hostile Work Environment Claims Call for Further Inquiry by
Courts

Hostile work environment claims do not present a religious liberty
concern that warrants a categorical bar be imposed. They are no more
invasive than any other type of claim that can be brought against religious
organizations.255 Additionally, hostile work environment claims address

F.R.D. 735, 736 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (addressing church-initiated defamation lawsuit);
Snyder v. Phelps, 580 F.3d 206, 226(4th Cir. 2009) (analyzing First Amendment
challenges to a church’s anti-homosexual speech); Church of Scientology v. Cazares,
638 F.2d 1272, 1277 (5th Cir. 1981) (granting standing to the church); General Conf.
Corp. v. McGill, 617 F.3d 402, 412 (6th Cir. 2010) (dismissing a pastor’s Free Exercise
defense to a trademark lawsuit); Vision Church v. Vill. of Long Grove, 468 F.3d 975, 988
(7th Cir. 2006) (determining impact of zoning regulation); Scenic Holding, LLC v. New
Bd. of Trs. of the Tabernacle Missionary Baptist Church, Inc., 506 F.3d 656, 660 (8th
Cir. 2007) (reviewing a foreclosure action); In re Roman Catholic Archbishop of
Portland, 335 B.R. 815, 842 (Bankr. D. Or. 2005) (permitting deposition of priests to
determine liability for sex abuse); Bistline v. Parker, 918 F.3d 849, 856 (10th Cir. 2019)
(investigating plaintiff’s claims against the church for forced child sex trafficking);
Church of Scientology Flag Serv. v. City of Clearwater, 2 F.3d 1514, 1519 (11th Cir.
1993) (inspecting whether city tax laws unconstitutionally discriminated against
religious organizations).
252. See e.g., Sumner v. Simpson Univ., 238 Cal. Rptr. 3d. 207, 223 (Cal. Ct. App.
2018) (allowing a ministerial employee’s breach of contract claim to proceed); Puri v.
Khalsa, 844 F.3d 1152, 1168 (9th Cir. 2017) (permitting plaintiff’s to seek injunctive
and declaratory relief against their deceased father’s employer); Herx v. Diocese of
Fort Wayne-South Bend, Inc., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28224 at *2 (N.D. Ind. 2015)
(affirming jury’s finding that the Diocese of Fort-Wayne South Bend violated Title VII
when they fired an elementary school teacher for undergoing in vitro fertilization).
253. Fitzgerald, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 194411, at *3 (authorizing limited discovery
to determine whether Plaintiff is a minister for the purpose of the exception).
254. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 879 (“[T]he right of free exercise does not relieve an
individual of the obligation to comply with a ‘valid and neutral law of general
applicability on the ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his
religion prescribes. . .” (citing United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982)
(Stevens, J., concurring))).
255. See Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d 294, 312 (3d Cir. 2006) (barring
Petruska’s Title VII claim from proceeding under the ministerial exception yet allowing
her breach of contract claim to proceed despite involving many similar facts); see also
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far-reaching issues that warrant further inquiry by the court. 256 Inspired
by the #MeToo movement, employees are more willing than ever to speak
out on their experiences with sexual harassment in the workplace.257 A
woman who was sexually harassed by her male coworkers at a secular
company can support a legal claim for hostile work environment by
offering evidence of unwanted sexual advances she experienced, requests
for sexual favors she received, and vulgar comments directed at her. 258
Her ability to prove these things does not change if she was instead
employed by a religiously-affiliated organization.259 If an employee who
was sexually harassed can present evidence in a way that does not
implicate the religious innerworkings of their employer, their claim
should be able to proceed. Religious employers should not be able to get
away with harassing their employees under the guise of religious liberty.
Yet by applying a categorical bar to all hostile work environment claims
brought by ministerial employees, courts are effectively allowing
religious organizations to do just that.
It has recently been proposed that rather than a categorical bar,
courts should engage in a general case-by-case analysis.260 The first
additional examples supra note 251 (collecting cases of claims brought against
religious organizations). See generally discussion supra Section III.C.
256. Kenneth R. Davis, Strong Medicine: Fighting the Sexual Harassment Pandemic,
79 OHIO ST. L.J. 1057, 1058 (2018) (calling attention to the role the law plays in the
“pandemic of sexual harassment” that is striking our country).
257. Rhitu Chatterjee, A New Survey Finds 81 Percent of Women Have Experienced
Sexual Harassment, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Feb. 21, 2018), www.npr.org/sections/thetwoway/2018/02/21/587671849/a-new-survey-finds-eighty-percent-of-women-haveexperienced-sexual-harassment [perma.cc/T9TF-UKXQ]. Prior to 2017, there was
little data collected on the prevalence of sexual harassment across the nation Id. The
#MeToo movement is often credited with breaking the silence around sexual
harassment and making it more acceptable for women to speak up when being
harassed. Id. According to an online survey launched in 2018, 38% of women report
experiencing sexual harassment in the workplace. Id.
258. See, e.g., EEOC v. Caterpillar Inc., 503 F. Supp. 2d 995, 1005-1011 (N.D. Ill.
2007) (permitting a female employee’s claim for hostile work environment where a
male security guard constantly made comments of a sexual nature to her, repeatedly
asked her to have sex with him and, after multiple rejections, told her that he would be
allowed to rape her in Romania).
259. In EEOC v. Caterpillar Inc., the employer was Caterpillar Inc., a private
company. Id. at 998. The employee, Virginia Early, worked as a fabrication specialist
on the first shift at a Caterpillar plant. Id. at 1005. She alleged that she was sexually
harassed by a security guard who she had interactions with at various locations in the
plant. Id. Central to the court’s analysis was the content of the security guard’s remarks,
how frequently they were made, how they made Early feel, and whether Early reported
the conduct. Id. at 1007–11. None of these factors would have changed had Early
worked as a guidance counselor at a religious school and had several encounters of the
same nature with the same security guard. Compare with Starkey, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
158254 at *2 (barring a hostile work environment claim brought by a guidance
counselor because she qualified as a ministerial employee).
260. Rachel Casper, When Harassment at Work is Harassment at Church: Hostile
Work Environments and the Ministerial Exception, 25 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 11, 14
(2021); Andrew White, Religion in Law: Workplace Harassment Suits By Ministers
Against Religious Institutions: Is The Seventh Circuit’s Categorical Bar Constitutionally
Required Or More Than Necessary?, 17 SEVENTH CIR. REV. 213, 248 (2021); see also
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argument is that the court’s analysis of a hostile work environment claim
brought by a ministerial employee does not categorically violate the First
Amendment.261 The next assertion is that a case-by-case analysis of
hostile work environment claims is “the only constitutionally sound
approach” moving forward.262 Though a case-by-case analysis “protects
religious organizations’ religious liberty and meets constitutional
demands,” it leaves open several questions around how a ministerial
employee can actually prove that adjudicating their claim does not
implicate a religious organization’s First Amendment right. 263 Treating
the ministerial exception as a rebuttable presumption is a more sound
approach, as it provides a clear, standardized framework for courts to use
when analyzing hostile work environment claims brought by employees
of religious organizations.264

B. The Ministerial Exception as a Rebuttable Presumption
The ministerial exception currently operates as an affirmative
defense.265 The party seeking to raise an affirmative defense has the
burden of proving it.266 Once proven, it bars the plaintiff’s claim from
proceeding, even if the plaintiff can prove their claim on its face.267
A rebuttable presumption, on the other hand, is “a presumption that
is conclusive until evidence sufficient to rebut its conclusion is
introduced, at which time the presumption ceases to provide any weight
Winnie Johnson, A Balancing Act: Hostile Work Environment and Harassment Claims by
Ministerial Employees, 96 TUL. L. REV. 193 (proposing the application of a two-element
test).
261. Casper, supra note 260, at 28–48. Casper frames the purposes of the
ministerial exception into two categories: “Selection and Control” and “ChurchMinister Relationship.” Id. at 29–30. Selection and Control refers to the desire
expressed in Hosanna-Tabor to give churches the “authority to select and control who
will minister the faith.” Id. at 29 (citing Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 194–195). ChurchMinister Relationship refers to the broad notion that religious organizations should be
free from judicial interference. Id. at 30.
262. Id. at 48–50.
263. Id. at 50.
264. See discussion infra Sections IV.B–I.VC.
265. Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 195 n.4 (“We conclude that the [ministerial]
exception operates as an affirmative defense to an otherwise cognizable claim, not a
jurisdictional bar.”). See DeWeese-Boyd v. Gordon College, 163 N.E.3d 1000, 1009
(Mass. 2021) (noting that because the ministerial exception operates as an affirmative
defense, all forms of discrimination claims can be barred). In DeWeese-Boyd, the
Plaintiff alleged that she was discriminatorily fired due to her gender and LGBTQ+
status. Id. at 1003. The Massachusetts Supreme Court explained that “[i]f the
ministerial exception applies, even if such allegations are true, the religious institution
will be free to discriminate on those bases.” Id at 1009. The Court acknowledges that
“[t]he same would be true for racial discrimination or discrimination on the basis of
national origin.” Id.
266. Affirmative Defense, THE WOLTERS KLUWER BOUVIER LAW DICTIONARY (Desk Ed.
2012).
267. Nathan Pysno, Should Twombly and Iqbal Apply to Affirmative Defenses?, 64
Vand. L. Rev. 1633, 1635 (2011) (debating the proper pleading standard for
affirmative defenses).
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beyond the weight inherent in the evidence from which the presumption
first arose.”268 Rebuttable presumptions can be overcome by providing
clear and convincing evidence that the presumption does not apply to the
present circumstances.269 Moreover, the presumption does not serve as
evidence itself.270 Instead, presumptions merely serve as “a procedural
device to aid the judge in allocating the burden of producing evidence.” 271
In essence, rebuttable presumptions aim to assist “reasoning and
argumentation,” while still leaving open further inquiry on the matter
assumed.272 Critically, they give courts the opportunity to hear evidence
from both sides and the discretion to rule as they see fit.
In the context of the ministerial exception, religious liberty
protections should only entitle employers to a rebuttable presumption
that hostile work environment claims brought by ministerial employees
will raise issues of religious concern. This approach affords religious
employers certain protections and permits employees to move forward
with viable claims of harassment. If a ministerial employee can provide
clear and convincing evidence that their specific hostile work
environment claim does not raise religious liberty issues, the court should
allow their claim to proceed. A procedural analysis of how the rebuttable
presumption can operate follows.
First, for the ministerial exception to apply, religious employers
must still be required to show that an employee is a minister for the
purposes of the exception.273 As the law stands now, this is the only thing
that a religious employer is required to show.274 Additionally, the
Supreme Court has given lower courts an incredible amount of discretion
when determining who qualifies as a ministerial employee.275 Following
Our Lady of Guadalupe, religious employers have had few issues proving
that individuals who hold seemingly secular roles are in fact ministerial
employees.276 Moving forward, religious employers should continue to be
268. Rebuttable Presumption, THE WOLTERS KLUWER BOUVIER LAW DICTIONARY (Desk
Ed. 2012).
269. Cf. In re Marriage of Asta, 2016 Ill. App. 2d. 150160 ¶ 16 (articulating how
rebuttable presumptions operate in the family law context).
270. See W.E. Shipley, Effect of Presumption as Evidence or Upon Burden of Proof,
Where Controverting Evidence Is Introduced, 5 A.L.R.3d 19, *2 (2022).
271. Id. (discussing Thayer, Preliminary Treatise on Evidence, VIII & IX); see also
Francis H. Bohlen, The Effect of Rebuttable Presumptions of Law Upon the Burden of
Proof, 68 U. PA. L. REV. 307 (1920).
272. Jacob A. Stein & Glenn A. Mitchell, 4 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 24.01 (2021).
273. Our Lady of Guadalupe, 140 S. Ct. at 2063 (stating that “what matters at
bottom, is what an employee does.”).
274. See Allison R. Ferraris, The Expansive Scope of the Ministerial Exception After
Our Lady of Guadalupe School v. Morrissey-Berru, 62 B.C. L. REV. E. SUPP. II. 280, 281
(2021) (laying out how the exception operates by barring an employee’s otherwise
viable discrimination claim if the employee qualifies as a minister for purposes of the
exception).
275. Our Lady of Guadalupe, 140 S. Ct. at 2063 (admitting that a variety of factors
may apply when determining if an employee is indeed a ministerial employee).
276. Starkey, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 158254 (guidance counselor); Demkovich II, 3
F.4th at 968 (teacher); Koenke, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3576 (music director); Cox v.
Bishop Eng. High Sch., 2020 S.C. C.P. LEXIS 4872 (teacher). But see DeWeese-Boyd, 163
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required to show that the employee’s role is one that is ministerial in
nature, as this is a reasonable requirement to impose on religious
employers and follows the precedent set forth in Our Lady of
Guadalupe.277
If the religious employer can successfully show that the employee is
a minister for the purposes of the exception, the court can presume that
the ministerial exception is applicable. Still, the plaintiff must be given the
opportunity to rebut the exception’s application. Thus, rather than acting
as an affirmative defense, the ministerial exception should operate as a
rebuttable presumption.278
After it is determined that the plaintiff is a ministerial employee, the
burden will shift to the plaintiff to produce enough evidence to show that
issues of excessive entanglement will not arise when adjudicating their
hostile work environment claim.279 This approach recognizes the value
our nation places on religious freedom while ensuring equal opportunity
exists for all. It simultaneously grants religious organizations a
reasonable amount of freedom to carry out their mission as they see fit
while still allowing employees to bring cognizable claims for hostile work
environment. If a plaintiff can show that their individual claim does not
implicate religious liberty concerns that warrant the application of the
exception, courts should allow their claim to proceed.

C. How a Plaintiff can Rebut the Application of the
Ministerial Exception
A plaintiff can rebut the application of the exception in a variety of
ways. Notably, this rebuttal may mirror how the employer proved that
the plaintiff is a ministerial employee in the first place.280 A plaintiff can

N.E.3d at 1002 (rejecting a private Christian liberal arts college argument that an
associate professor of social work was a ministerial employee).
277. See Our Lady of Guadalupe, 140 S. Ct. at 2064 (looking squarely at “what an
employee does” to determine whether they are a minister for the purposes of the
exception).
278. Cf. Aimee Fukuchi, A Balance of Convenience: The Use of Burden-Shifting
Devices in Criminal Cyberharassment Law, 52 B.C. L. REV. 289, 310 (2011) (comparing
affirmative defenses and rebuttable presumptions in the criminal context). Affirmative
defenses “place the burden on the [defendant] to come forward with exculpatory facts”
while presumptions “allow one fact to be inferred by evidence of another” and permit
a party to “produce evidence sufficient to invalidate the presumption.” Id. at 312.
279. See William R. Corbett, Unmasking a Pretext for Res Ipsa Loquitor: A Proposal
to Let Employment Discrimination Speak for Itself, 62 AM. U.L. REV. 447, 486 (2013)
(unraveling the McDonnell Douglas framework). The McDonnell Douglas framework
refers to an analysis often utilized in the adjudication of employment discrimination
claims. Id. at 450; see generally McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, a plaintiff “enjoys a rebuttable presumption
of discrimination” if they are able to “satisfy the burden of production of a prima facie
case.” Corbett, supra at 486.
280. See, e.g., Hosanna Tabor, 565 U.S. at 191–94 (analyzing the employee’s job
title, job contract, duties, and training); Fisher v. Archdiocese of Cincinnati, 6 N.E.3d
1254, P4–P7 (Ohio Ct. App. 2014) (utilizing provisions in the employee handbook and
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highlight any secular duties they undertook to show that they do not carry
out the employer’s core spiritual mission. They can also present evidence
to argue that all other actors involved in their allegations are not directly
involved with the employer’s core spiritual mission. Allegations of
minister-on-minister harassment may pose more of an excessive
entanglement risk compared to allegations of harassment by a secular
employee.281 Still, religious employers should not be completely insulated
from claims because the religious entity themselves claimed that two
ministers were involved.282 Courts should consider all of a plaintiff’s
duties, along with the duties and responsibilities of others involved in the
claim, before deciding to bar a plaintiff’s claim due to excessive
entanglement issues.
A plaintiff should also be afforded an opportunity to show the court
that the alleged harassment has absolutely nothing to do with their
employer’s religious mission. Likewise, the religious employer can inform
the court whether they intend to offer a religious justification for the
alleged harassment.283 Understandably, courts want to avoid ruling on
the merits of religious beliefs.284 However, inquiring as to whether a
religious justification was offered for the harassment would not require
the court to make such a ruling. All the court needs to consider at this
stage is whether the employer has offered a religious justification for the
alleged harassment and discrimination, not whether that justification is
compelling.285 Additionally, offering a religious justification is neither
required nor dispositive. Thus, the religious employer is afforded
faith-based training received to find that the employee was a minister).
281. See Demkovich II, 3 F.4th at 978. But see Demkovich I, 973 F. 3d at 734 (“We
are not persuaded that the risk of substantive entanglement is so great that this case
or all such cases must be dismissed without further inquiry or discovery.”).
282. See generally Shea Sisk Wellford, Tort Actions Against Churches—What
Protections Does the First Amendment Provide?, 25 U. MEM. L. REV. 193, 212-215 (1999)
(looking at how the relationship between a plaintiff and church impacts the breadth of
ecclesiastical abstention, a doctrine somewhat similar to that of the ministerial
exception).
283. See generally Billard v. Charlotte Catholic High Sch., 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
167418, at *2 (W.D.N.C. 2021) (accepting that “religious and philosophical objections
to gay marriage are protected views and, in some instances, protected forms of
expressions.”). The desire to protect religious beliefs, particularly religious objections
to same-sex marriage, should not be treated as an absolute justification for
discrimination. Id. (making clear that “[t]he laws and the Constitution can, and in some
instances must, protect [gay persons and gay couples] in their exercise in civil and
employment rights.”). See also Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1727 (declaring that
“our society has come to the recognition that gay persons and gay couples cannot be
treated as social outcasts or as inferior in dignity and worth.”).
284. United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. at 263 n.2 (Stevens J., concurring) (specifying
that “the risk that governmental approval of some [religions] and disapproval of others
will be perceived as favoring one religion over another is an important risk the
Establishment Clause was designed to preclude.”).
285. See Jessica R. Vartanian, Confessions of the Church: Discriminatory Practices by
Religious Employers and Justifications for a More Narrow Ministerial Exception, 40 U.
TOL. L. REV. 1049, 1057 (2009) (advocating that “even when a church proffers a
religious justification to refute a plaintiff’s secular claim, continued adjudication does
not automatically run afoul of the First Amendment.”).
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absolute discretion as to whether they want to provide the court with a
justification.
In the case of Demkovich, the beloved choir director, treating the
ministerial exception as a rebuttable presumption may have made a
significant difference in the adjudication of his case.286 The Seventh
Circuit’s inquiry into Demkovich’s claims stopped once it was determined
that Demkovich was a ministerial employee and that the Seventh Circuit
categorically bars all hostile work environment claims brought by
ministerial employees.287 Had Demkovich been given the opportunity to
show that his claim involved sufficiently secular issues, his claims may
have survived the church’s motion to dismiss.288 Demkovich could have
provided details about the harassment he was subjected to, submitted
affidavits from other employees who witnessed him being harassed, and
produced other kinds of evidence to argue that adjudicating his claim
would not raise excessive entanglement concerns.289 The church could
have then offered their religious justification for the alleged harassment
or furnished other evidence to bolster the presumption that the
ministerial exception barred all claims.290 Once all of these steps were
taken under the rebuttable presumption approach, the court would
finally be best suited to make a well-informed decision regarding whether
Demkovich’s disability-based or sexual orientation-based claim should
survive the church’s motion to dismiss.
In the end, when determining whether a plaintiff has successfully
rebutted the application of the exception, the court must look at whether
the plaintiff can meet the prima facie elements required to prove their
case without delving into serious areas of religious concerns.291 To prevail
286. See discussion supra Part III.
287. Demkovich II, 3 F.4th at 985 (dismissing Demkovich disability-based hostile
work environment claims and sexual orientation-based hostile work environment
claims).
288. See, e.g., Demkovich, 343 F. Supp. 3d at 787–89 (permitting Demkovich’s
disability-based claim to survive because he adequately stated a claim for relief); see
also Demkovich I, 973 F.3d at 736 (permitting both Demkovich’s disability-based and
his sexual orientation claim to survive).
289. Demkovich, 343 F. Supp. 3d at 787. Demkovich’s Amended Complaint included
several instances of harassment for which the church did not offer a religious
justification. Id. at 788-789. These allegations include but are not limited to: being
repeatedly told to exercise and lose weight by his supervisor, being told his weight
made it cost prohibitive for the parish to include him in insurance plans, being told by
his supervisor to “get his weight under control” to eliminate his need for insulin, and
otherwise being humiliated and belittled to the point that his physical and mental
health suffered. Id. at 789.
290. Id. at 786 (noting that the Archdiocese offered a religious justification for
some of the alleged derogatory remarks). In the eyes of the district court, a religious
justification weighed in favor of finding that an excessive-entanglement concern
existed, however, it was not the sole factor considered. Id. Other factors included
Demkovich’s status as a minister and potential burdens that could be encountered in
the discovery process. Id. at 786-787. The Seventh Circuit later found that even if a
religious justification is offered, that does not necessarily mean issues of excessive
entanglement are implicated. Demkovich I, 973 F.2d at 733-736.
291. See Texas Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981) (pointing
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on a claim for hostile work environment under Title VII, a plaintiff must
show that: (1) the employee belonged to a protected class, (2) the
employee was the subject of unwanted harassment, (3) the harassment
complained of was based on their protected class, and (4) the harassment
was sufficiently severe to unreasonably interfere with work performance
or create an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work environment. 292
Proving membership of a protected class will almost never implicate
religious concerns.293 Accordingly, the court should focus on whether the
employee has presented enough evidence to show that they can meet the
remaining three elements without implicating religious concerns. Courts
should look at the totality of the circumstances, including evidence
offered by both the religious employer as well as evidence offered by the
employee, before determining that the exception should apply to a claim.
This approach gives a reasonable amount of deference to religious
organizations while ensuring ministerial employees have a fair
opportunity to litigate their hostile work environment claims in court.

D. Policy Interest at Stake
Though the concept of the ministerial exception is not problematic
in theory, the application of the exception has completely eroded the
rights of individuals who are employed by religious organizations. In light
of Hosanna-Tabor and Our Lady of Guadalupe, employees with a large
number of secular duties now qualify as a minister for the purposes of the
exception.294 As the law stands now, these ministerial employees are
unable to bring any Title VII claims against their employers. They have no
way to hold their employers accountable for discriminatory and
harassing conduct. Under the guise of religious freedom, religious
employers are free to discriminate and harass as they see fit. Given the
current trend towards expanding antidiscrimination protections and a
out that “the burden of a prima facie case of disparate treatment is not onerous.”). The
Court also emphasized that “the prima facie case serves an important function in
litigation.” Id. They reasoned:
the prima facie case "raises an inference of discrimination only because we
presume these acts, if otherwise unexplained, are more likely than not based
on the consideration of impermissible factors." Establishment of the prima
facie case in effect creates a presumption that the employer unlawfully
discriminated against the employee.
Id. at 254 (citing Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978)).
292. Sara L. Johnson, When Is a Work Environment Intimidating, Hostile, or
Offensive, so as to Constitute Sexual Harassment in Violation of Title VII of Civil Rights
Act of 1964, as amended (42 U.S.C.A §§ 2000e et seq.), 78 A.L.R FED. 252, 2 (1986).
293. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.S. §2000e-2(a). Protected
classes under Title VII include race, color, religion, sex, and national origin. Id. See
Anastasia Niedrich, Removing Categorical Constraints on Equal Employment
Opportunities and Anti-Discrimination Protections, 18 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 25, 31-32
(2011) (making evident that using a categorical bar needs to be abandoned if
discrimination is to ever be eradicated).
294. Our Lady of Guadalupe, 140 S. Ct. at 2049; Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 171.
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general state interest in ensuring a safe workplace, allowing religious
employers to be entirely exempt from Title VII suits does not make sense
from a policy perspective.295 Thus, courts need to look beyond the status
of an employee before dismissing their claims to ensure that antidiscrimination safeguards are upheld.

V.

CONCLUSION

Since its inception, the ministerial exception has immunized
religious employers from otherwise valid Title VII suits. It has allowed
religious organizations to manipulate their First Amendment freedoms in
a way that puts them above the law. Because of the ministerial exception,
countless employees who have been harassed and discriminated against
do not get their day in court. This practice is a grave miscarriage of justice
and cannot continue. Treating the ministerial exception as a rebuttable
presumption is the best way to ensure that courts can properly balance
historical religious liberty concerns with the ever-increasing need to
ensure anti-discrimination safeguards are in place. Adopting this
approach will allow employees who are discriminated against and
harassed to seek justice and hold their abusive employers accountable. It
will also protect a religious organization’s right to operate in accordance
with their sincerely held religious beliefs. Most of all, it is an inquiry that
our justice system is more than capable of conducting. Treating the
ministerial exception as a rebuttable presumption and permitting
employees to show that their claims are secular is a necessary first step
in piercing the ministerial exception and holding religious organizations
accountable under law.

295. See Bostock, 140 S. Ct. 1731 (expanding Title VII to cover discrimination based
on sexual orientation); Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, #MeToo Meets the Ministerial
Exception: Sexual Harassment Claims by Clergy and The First Amendment’s Religion
Clauses, 25 WM. & MARY J. RACE, GENDER & SOC. JUST. 249, 253 (2019) (concluding that
“the First Amendment's Religion Clauses should not bar either compensatory or
punitive damage claims for pervasive, hostile environments based on sex.”).
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